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INTRODUCTION

Autonomous weapons those weapons that can select and engage
targets without human involvement' herald perhaps the most fundamental
change in warfare in generations. The rise of autonomous weapons has
sparked a robust international debate centered on one key question: Are the
current laws of armed conflict sufficient to govern autonomous weapon
systems? Positions span the spectrum from a call for preemptive prohibition 2
to arguments that current legal norms are adequate to regulate these future
weapon systems. 3 While autonomy may give rise to circumstances in which
the application of the law is rendered uncertain or difficult, the current
normative legal framework is sufficient to regulate the new technology.

1.

BONNIE DOCHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE

AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (Steve Goose ed., 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/
losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots.
2. E.g., id.
3.
E.g., Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous
Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can, HOOVER INST.
(Apr. 9, 2013), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Anderson-Waxm

anLawAndEthicsr2_FINAL.pdf.
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The legality of such weapons has generated significant interest in both
the public and private sectors. The International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC) has hosted two meetings of experts,4 and the United Nations,
within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
(CCW), has convened three informal meetings of experts and recently
recommended the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts to
study the issue.5 State interest in autonomous weapons has been keen.
Fourteen States have publicly called for a preemptive ban on autonomous
weapons. 6 Other States have taken an active role in the debate, including
notably the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, India,
Pakistan, Canada, France, Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, and
Germany. 7
Numerous non-governmental organizations have been deeply involved
in the issue, including the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR), 8 Geneva Academy, 9 Center for a New American
Security,' 0 Human Rights Watch and the Human Rights Clinic at Harvard
Law School," the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and

4.
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, EXPERT MEETING: AUTONOMOUS WEAPON
SYSTEM: TECHNOLOGICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL, AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 5 (2014).
5.
Frank Sauer, Arms Controlfor A WS: 2016 and Beyond, INT'L COMM. FOR ROBOT
ARMS CONTROL (Dec. 7, 2016), https://icrac.net/2016/12/arms-control-for-aws-2016-and-

beyond/.
6.
Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2016/04/thirdmtg/ (noting that the following
countries have publicly endorsed a ban: Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador,
Egypt, Ghana, Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, State of Palestine, and Zimbabwe).
7. See Statements from the 2016 CCW Meeting of Experts on Autonomous Weapons,
REACHING CRITICAL WILL (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmamentfora/ccw/2016/laws/statements.
8.
See, e.g., Framing Discussions on the Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous
Technologies, U.N. INST. FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH 1, 2 (2014), http://www.unidir.org/
files/publications/pdfs/framing-discussions-on-the-weaponization-of-increasingly-autonomous
-technologies-en-606.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Nathalie Weizmann, Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International
Law Academy, Briefing No. 8, GENEVA ACAD. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUM.
RIGHTS (Nov. 2014), https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Publicat
ions/Academy%20Briefings/Autonomous%2OWeapon%20Systems%20under%20Internationa
1%20LawAcademy%20Briefing%20No%208.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Michael Horowitz & Paul Scharre, An Introduction to Autonomy in
Weapon Systems 2 (Feb. 13, 2015) (working paper) (on file with Center for a New American
Security), https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Publications/Acade
my%20Briefings/Autonomous%2OWeapon%20Systems%20under%20International%2OLaw_
Academy%20Briefing%20No%208.pdf.
11. See, e.g., DOCHERTY, supra note 1.
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Armed Conflict,' 2 the United States Army Strategic Studies Institute,1 3 the
International Institute of Humanitarian Law,1 4 the Friedrich-EbertStiftung," the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,1 6 and the
Advisory Council on International Affairs for the Netherlands.'" Civil
society organizations have likewise addressed the subject.
This Article considers the entirety of positions and seeks to present a
comprehensive, objective discussion of the relevant issues in international
law. In the course of this examination, the Article reaches two broad
conclusions. First, autonomy is less a technology as it is a capability
comprised of multiple technologies. For this reason, this Article uses the
term Autonomy Enabled Weapons (AEWs) rather than the more common
Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs). AEWs cannot be considered a
homogeneous category of weapons that comply, or not, with the law of
armed conflict. Rather, whether a given system meets the requirements of
this body of law will depend on the system and the manner in which it is
used. Second, this Article argues that the normative framework established
by the law of armed conflict is sufficient to ensure the lawful operation of
most types of weapons employing autonomous technologies.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II considers various approaches
used by researchers trying to define autonomy, including the discussion in
other fields such as aerospace and aeronautical engineering. Part III
examines AEWs in the context of the law of armed conflict. In addition to
consideration of the rules of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in

12. See, e.g., DUSTIN A. LEWIS ET AL., HARVARD LAW SCH. PROGRAM ON INT'L LAW
AND ARMED CONFLICT, WAR-ALGORITHM ACCOUNTABILITY (2016), https://pilac.law.harvard
.edu/waa/.
13. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. CANTON, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. STRATEGIC STUDIES INST.,
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS: A BRIEF SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTAL, OPERATIONAL,
LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES xi (James G. Pierce ed., 2015).
14. See, e.g., Proceedings, INT'L INST. OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, http://stage.iihl.org/pr
oceedings/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
15. See, e.g., ROBIN GEISS, FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG, THE INTERNATIONAL-LAW
DIMENSION OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 6 (2015), http://1ibrary.fes.de/pdf-files/id/i

pa/1 1673.pdf.
16. See, e.g., VINCENT BOULANIN, SIPRI INSIGHTS ON PEACE AND SECURITY NO.
2015/1, IMPLEMENTING ARTICLE 36 WEAPON REVIEWS IN THE LIGHT OF INCREASING
AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 1 (2015), https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/files/insig

ht/SIPRIlnsight 1501 .pdf
17. See, e.g., ADVIESRAAD INTERNATIONALE VRAAGSTUKKEN,
AUTONOMOUS
WEAPON SYSTEMS: THE NEED FOR MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL (2016), http://aiv-advies

.nl/8gr.
18. See, e.g., Ban Support Grows, Process Goes Slow, supra note 6; IntroductionAutonomous Weapons, ARTICLE 36 (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.article36.org/autonomous-we
apons/introduction-autonomous-weapons/.
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attack, this Part includes a discussion of the concept of "meaningful human
control." Part IV addresses the requirement to test new weapons to ensure
their compliance with international law. A discussion of accountability for
the use of AEWs, including individual liability, command responsibility, and
State responsibility concludes the piece.
II.

DEFINING AUTONOMY

'

A common definition of an autonomous weapon used in the legal
literature is a weapon that can select and engage a target without human
involvement. 19 While this definition is commendably succinct, it raises
significant questions: What does it mean to "select"? How and when can
systems operate "without human involvement" if all systems are
programmed by humans? Defining autonomy has proven vexing for all
disciplines, particularly aeronautical and aerospace engineering, which have
debated the issue for decades. 20 Diplomats and government arms control
officials have struggled. At the 2016 CCW Informal Meeting of Experts,
States failed to reach consensus over whether they should even attempt to
define the term "autonomous." 2
Where States and legal academics have tried to define relevant terms,
they have adopted several distinct approaches. 22 These approaches are not
necessarily contradictory, and at times commentators have adopted
combinations thereof. This Part will briefly summarize each approach and
then provide a suggested framework.
A.

DefiningAutonomy as a Discrete Concept

The term "autonomous" derives from the Greek words autos meaning
"self' and nomos meaning "law." 23 The etymology of the word directly
informs the common meaning of the term, often understood as something

19. See, e.g., DOCHERTY, supra note 1.
20. See generally Chad R. Frost, Challenges and Opportunities for Autonomous
Systems in Space, in FRONTIERS OF ENGINEERING: REPORTS ON LEADING-EDGE
ENGINEERING FROM THE 2010 SYMPOSIUM 89-90 (showing the difficulty in defining the term
"autonomy").
21. Chris Ford & Chris Jenks, The International Discussion Continues: 2016 CCW
Experts Meeting on Lethal Autonomous Weapons, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 20, 2016), https://ww
w.justsecurity.org/30682/2016-ccw-experts-meeting-laws/.
22. See discussion infra Sections IIA-IID.
23. Autonomous, ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/inde
x.php?term=autonomous&allowedinframe=0.
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that is self-governing. 24 This construct does not surface in legal discourse,
perhaps because of the legal term of art "govern." This formulation is,
however, used on occasion in the engineering fields. 25
In the legal space, most definitions tend to be a variation on the notion
that the term denotes a weapon system that can select and engage a target
without human involvement. Examples include definitions proffered by the
U.S. Department of Defense, 26 the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, 27
the Geneva Academy, 28 Center for a New American Security, 29 the
Netherlands Advisory Council on International Affairs, 30 UN Special
Rapporteur Christof Heyns, 31 Michael Schmitt and Jeff Thumher, 32 and
Rebecca Crootof.33 Given the centrality of this definitional approach, it is
useful to consider its parts: (1) weapons; that can (2) select and engage a
target; (3) without human involvement.
1.

Weapons

For this Article, "weapon" is read to mean those instruments intended to
damage, destroy, or injure personnel or property. 34 This Article does not

24. Autonomous, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (online ed. 2016) (autonomous is
something "having the power or right to govern itself').
25. See, e.g., FED. AGENCIES AD HOC AUTONOMY LEVELS FOR UNMANNED SYSTEMS
WORKING GROUP PARTICIPANTS, AUTONOMY LEVELS FOR UNMANNED SYSTEMS (ALFUS)
FRAMEWORK 8 (Hui-Min Huang ed., 2004) [hereinafter AD HOC AUTONOMY]; Panos J.
Antsaklis et al., An Introduction to Autonomous Control Systems, in 5TH IEEE INT'L
SYMPOSIUM ON INTELLIGENT CONTROL (1991).
26. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13-14

(Nov. 2012), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dadd/300009p.pdf
[hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE].
27. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11: THE UK APPROACH TO
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ¶ 203 at 2-3 (2011).
28. Weizmann, supra note 9, at 5.
29. Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 10, at 25.
30. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INT'L AFFAIRS & ADVISORY COMM. ON ISSUES OF PUB.
INT'L LAW, AUTONOMOUS
CONTROL 11 (2015).

WEAPON SYSTEMS: THE NEED FOR MEANINGFUL HUMAN

31. Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary
Executions), Rep. to Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 ¶ 38 (Apr. 9, 2013).
32. Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon
Systems and the Law ofArmed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 231, 235 (2013).
33. Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 106 (2015).
34. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NAVAL INSTRUCTION 5000.2E, T 1.6.1.c; U.S.
DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-402, WEAPONS REVIEW 1 (1994); Int'l

Comm. of the Red Cross Geneva, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and
Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88
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distinguish between weapons designed to operate in a defensive posture and
those intended for offensive applications. Nor is a distinction drawn between
those weapons designed to kill or injure.
2.

Select and Engage a Target

The second component of the definition refers to the ability of the
system to "select and engage" targets.35 The term "select" is widely
understood to mean to "choose among" a group.36 The ordinary meaning of
"engage" in the military context to "enter into combat or battle"3 7
requires some clarification. With regards to autonomous weapons systems,
engage could refer to at least three different points in time: (1) when the
system is activated; (2) when the system is operationally selecting targets; or
(3) when the system is applying the instrument designed to kill, injure, or
destroy its selected target. Most commentators-and this author read
engage to refer to the third meaning. 38
Thus, by this approach, the machine is selecting among several targets
and making a determination as to when and where to engage the chosen
target with the weapon. This reading would exclude remotely controlled
systems where a human operator determines which target to engage, and
when, such as the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper 39 and MQ-1 Predator. 40
The phrase "select and engage targets" also serves to exclude autonomous
functions that are unrelated to targeting and engaging such as navigation.

INT'L REV. RED CROSS 864, 938 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC WEAPONS GUIDE]; INT'L GROUP
OF EXPERTS, NATO COOPERATION CYBER DEF., TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 142 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) ("A weapon is

generally understood as the aspect of the system used to cause damage or destruction to
objects or to injure or death to persons.") [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL]; THE PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIV., HPCR: MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE 49 (2010) ("The essence
of a weapon is that it is an object used to cause (i) death of, or injury to, persons; or (ii)
damage to, or destruction, of objects.").
35. See, e.g., DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 26, at 14; Weizmann, supra note 9, at 6.
36.
37.

Select, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).
Engage, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016).

38. See DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 26, at 14; Weizmann, supra note 9, at 6.
39. MQ-9 Reaper, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSh
eets/Display/tabid/224/Article/ 104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx.
40. MQ-]B Predator, U.S. AIR FORCE (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fa
ct-Sheets/Display/Article/104469/mq-lb-predator/.
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Without Human Involvement

The final component of the definition requires that the actions of the
system occur "without human involvement." 4' The presence and degree of
human participation in a weapons system are not always clear. Consider the
Aegis Combat System, a ship-borne weapon that can identify threats and
engage threats automatically, or allow a human operator to make the
engagement decision. 42 Even in the latter case, it selects the targets, and the
operator's decision to engage is based entirely on data provided by the
system. In such a circumstance, is a human involved? Is the operator adding
any value to the process or just pressing a button?
The difference between automaticity and autonomy is rather indistinct,
since, as the ICRC has noted, both types of systems "have the capacity to
independently select and attack targets within the bounds of their humandetermined programming." 43 One is left wondering what degree of freedom
in a system is sufficient such that the system is considered to be operating
without human involvement.
The ICRC concludes that "[t]he difference appears only to be the degree
of 'freedom' with which the weapon system can select and attack different
targets." 44 Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, draws a distinction in the nature of the
system's operation: "Automatic systems, such as household appliances,
operate within a structured and predictable environment. Autonomous
systems can function in an open environment, under unstructured and
dynamic circumstances." 45 This definition is unsatisfying since automatic
systems can operate in unstructured and dynamic circumstances.
Conversely, autonomous systems can function in structured and predictable
environments.
The engineering literature provides a more robust discussion of
definitions of autonomy. 46 In a paper examining autonomy in aerospace
applications, a senior NASA researcher proposed the following:

41. See, e.g., DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 26, at 14; Weizmann, supra note 9, at 6.
42. Gary E. Marchant et al., InternationalGovernance ofAutonomous Military Robots,
12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 273 (2011).
43. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 4, at 64.
44. Id.
45. Heyns, supra note 31, ¶ 42.
46. See, e.g., Raja Parasuraman et al., A Model for Types and Levels of Human
Interaction with Automation, 30 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND
CYBERNETICS-PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS 286, 287 (2000); AD HOC AUTONOMY, supra
note 25, at 8; Antsaklis et al., supra note 25, at 5; BRUCE T. CLOUGH, AIR FORCE RESEARCH
LIBRARY, METRICS,

SCHMETRICS!

HOW
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An automated system doesn't make choices for itself-it follows a
script, albeit a potentially sophisticated script, in which all possible
courses

of action have

already been made .

. .

. Thus

for an

automated system, choices have either already been made and
encoded, or they must be made externally. By contrast, an
autonomous system does make choices on its own. It tries to
accomplish its objectives locally, without human intervention, even
when encountering uncertainty or unanticipated events. 47
Both autonomous and automated systems may be predictable with
regards to the overall action of the system say the destruction of a tank
but the particular, or component actions, of an autonomous system are not
readily predictable. Thus, it seems that the distinction between automated
and autonomous turns on the predictability of the system, specifically the
component actions of the system. 48
Plainly, what constitutes autonomous (e.g., without human involvement)
and automated (e.g., with human involvement) is quite complex. This
complexity points to the disadvantage of the discrete definitional approach.
While such a definition is readily understood, it is too simplistic. Aside from
the difficulties of parsing out automated from autonomous, consider what it
means for a system to "select" a target? If the system has been programmed
to select among two predetermined targets, has the machine selected
anything? What if the selection is among 500 targets? Clearly, adding some
nuance to the definition serves a useful function.
B. DefiningAutonomy as a Spectrum
It is tempting to conceptualize autonomy as a binary proposition: either
something is autonomous or not. It is more useful, however, to consider
autonomy as a spectrum. Parsing out "highly" autonomous systems from
"low-level" autonomous systems, however, requires the application of
criteria against which one can judge the level of autonomy.
In a project designed to develop a "framework to facilitate
characterizing and articulating autonomy for unmanned systems," the U.S.
National Institutes of Standards and Technology proposed a three-part

AUTONOMY ANYWAY? (2002), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a515926.pdf; WALT
TRUSZKOWSKI ET AL., AUTONOMOUS AND AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS: WITH APPLICATIONS TO
NASA INTELLIGENT SPACECRAFT OPERATIONS AND EXPLORATION SYSTEMS (2009).

47. Frost, supra note 20, at 2.
48. See, e.g., U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. It., Statement to the Informal Meeting of Experts
on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Apr. I1-15, 2016).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
422

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6 9: 413

framework that looked at human independence, mission complexity, and
environmental complexity. 49 Other researchers have spoken of attributes of
autonomy that include independence from operator interaction, adaptability
to environment, and the machine's ability to adapt the means of achieving
the ends.5 0 Another researcher characterizes autonomy as a function of "the
capacity to operate without outside intervention," the ability to choose
actions and capacity to choose whether to choose."
Pioneering researchers in the field of autonomy, Thomas Sheridan and
William Verplank, developed a ten-level spectrum of autonomy, which, in
2
its essence, is a spectrum of human involvement in a machine's process.5
Similarly, in a document entitled Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap
FY 2011-2036, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) expressed autonomy
on a three-part scale that distinguishes between automated, semiautonomous, and autonomous weapons-again depending on the level of
human involvement.5 3 The Center for a New American Security employs a
similar scale.5 4 The distinction between semi-autonomous and autonomous
systems refers to whether a human operator selects the target.5 5
Considering autonomy as a spectrum provides some much-needed
granularity to the discussion but fails to provide a satisfying definition.
Looking to the DoD construct, whether a system is autonomous or semiautonomous depends on whether the system "selects" the target. DoD
Directive 3000.09 attempts to clarify this distinction by excluding from the
definition of autonomous weapons those systems where "individual targets

49. Hui-Min Huang, Software & Mech. Eng'r with Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech.,
PowerPoint Presentation on Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (July 20-21, 2005),
http://www.nist.gov/el/isd/ks/upload/ALFUS-BG.pdf.
50. See Troy B. Jones & Mitch G. Leammukda, Requirements-Driven Autonomous
System Test Design: Building Trusting Relationships, 15TH ANNUAL LIVE-VIRTUALCONSTRUCTIVE CONFERENCE INT'L TEST AND EVALUATION Ass'N 1, 6 (2011), https://www.r
esearchgate.net/profile/MitchLeammukda/publication/228598990_Requirements-Driven_Aut
onomousSystem Test Design BuildingTrustingRelationships/links/00b49536d4800877cd
000000/Requirements-Driven-Autonomous-System-Test-Design-Building-Trusting-Relationsh
ips.pdf.
51. O.G. Clark et al., Mind and Autonomy in Engineered Biosystems, 12 ENG'G
APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 389, 397 (1999).
52. THOMAS B. SHERIDAN & WILLIAM L. VERPLANK, HUMAN AND COMPUTER
CONTROL OF UNDERSEA TELEOPERATORS (1978), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/downlo
ad?doi=10.1.1.694.7165&rep=repl&type=pdf.
53. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP FY 2011-2036
43 (2013), https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/usroadmap20l1.pdf. This scale is also seen in
other DoD policy documents. See, e.g., DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 26, at 22.
54. Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 10, at 5-7.
55. Id. at 16.
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or specific target groups [] have been selected by a human operator." 56 This
language again begs the question of what is meant by "select." If the human
operator instructs the machine to target threats (which have been
preprogrammed), is the machine "selecting" when it attacks a particular
object? This approach also fails to consider that a system may have varying
levels of autonomy in its various subsystems.
C.

Autonomy as a Loop

Another common method for conceptually organizing levels of
autonomy is considering autonomy in the context of "the loop."5 7 This
approach is really a variation of the "autonomy as a spectrum" approach and
has been used by Christof Heyns," Human Rights Watch,59 the Center for a
New American Security,60 Rebecca Crootof,6 1 Markus Wagner, 62 and
others. This definitional construct breaks autonomy into three categories
based on the nature of human/machine interaction. 63
In an influential paper, a group of computer scientists reviewed the
cognitive psychology literature and suggested that all decision-making and
action can be roughly simplified into four categories: information
acquisition, information analysis, decision and action selection, and action
implementation. 64 A popular formulation of this taxonomy is John Boyd's
OODA loop, where the variables are described as observe, orient, decide,
and act. 65 In this definitional framework, autonomy is an expression of the
human's involvement (or lack thereof) in the "loop," which refers to the
information processing cycle of the machine. 66 Autonomy then is expressed
as a function of the "human in the loop," "human on the loop," or "human
out of the loop." 67

56.

DoD DIRECTIVE, supra note 26, at 3.

57. Heyns, supra note 31, at 8; DOCHERTY, supra note 1, at 3; Horowitz & Scharre,
supra note 10, at 8.
58. Heyns, supra note 31, at 8.
59.

DOCHERTY, supra note 1, at 3.

60. Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 10, at 8.
61. Crootof, supra note 33, at 125.
62. Markus Wagner, Taking Humans Out of the Loop: Implications for International
Humanitarian Law, 21(2) J.L. INFO. & SCI. 155, 155 (2011), http://www6.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/viewdoc/au/journals/JlLawInfoSci/2012/9.html.
63. See Heyns, supra note 31, at 2-3.
64. Parasuraman et al., supra note 46, at 288.
65. John Boyd, PowerPoint Presentation on The Essence of Winning and Losing (June
28, 1995), http://www.danford.net/boyd/essence.htm.
66.

See DOCHERTY, supra note 1, at 2.

67.

Id. at 2-3.
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Human in the loop refers to a situation where the human operator plays
an integral role in the operation of the machine-the machine cannot
accomplish its task without human involvement. 68 A human on the loop
system is one in which the human monitors the system and can intervene
before the system takes action.69 Finally, where the system is a human out of
the loop, the human plays no role in the machine's execution of its task. 70
There is also the possibility that a human could be "near the loop." 7
This phrase is a new concept that reflects situations where an autonomous
system is deployed near humans. For instance, an autonomous system to
provide logistical support. The system may be operating autonomously such
that there is no one on or in the loop. The unit commander can, however,
observe the battlefield and the operation of the system. If the commander
sees something that would necessitate changes to the functioning of the
autonomous system, the commander would have the ability to inform an
operator who could then get on or in the loop and make the appropriate
changes.
However one characterizes the loop, there are potential issues with this
definitional framework. As some authors have cautioned, given the
complexity of certain systems, it might be overly simplistic to characterize a
particular system as an "in/on/out" system. 72 Further, a system may have
several decisional loops regarding various aspects of its operations, some of
which may (or may not) have human involvement. There is also an inherent
difficulty in characterizing the precise nature of the human's role.
D. Information ProcessingModels and Scales ofAutonomy
A final way to consider autonomy is to combine different frameworks
such as informational processing models together with a scale of autonomy.
A 2016 report from the U.S. Department of Defense Science Board (DSB),
for example, uses the formulation of sense, think/decide, act, and team. 73
The report usefully further breaks down each factor into technology that is

68. Id.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. See, e.g., William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding "The Loop
Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36 FARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1139, 1179
(2012) [hereinafter The Loop].
73. DEF. SCIENCE BD., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., TASK FORCE REPORT: SUMMER STUDY ON
AUTONOMY 9 (2016).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/5

12

Ford: Autonomous Weapons and International Law
2017]

425

AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

available today, likely available in the near term, and may be available in the
long term. 74

Others, such as the Air Force Research Laboratory, have combined
Sheridan and Verplank's scale of autonomy with Boyd's OODA loop to
create a table of autonomous control levels. 7 5 This model allows one to
express varying levels of autonomy for each part of the OODA loop. Thus,
a system may be highly autonomous with regards to its ability to "observe"
but completely lacking autonomy in its ability to "act." This construct allows
commentators and policymakers a more precise mechanism for describing
what is being discussed, regulated, or both.
There is perhaps no single best way to define autonomous weapons. It
would seem, however, that there is utility in considering autonomous
functions against an informational processing model such as the OODA
loop. Such a formulation allows users to precisely describe the autonomous
attributes of a given system, which may vary widely in a particular system.
For example, a system might be highly autonomous in its ability to observe
and orient itself but have a low level of autonomy in deciding and acting.
This Article then suggests the following chart as a useful framework to
consider the autonomous functions of a weapon system.

Examples
Level IV
systems
do not yet
exist.

Computer
gathers data
without
direction.
Provides no
information to
a human
controller.
What is
observed is
unpredictable.

Computer
analyzes data
without any
human input
or report to a
human
controller.
Computer
analysis is
unseen and
unpredictable.

Decide
Computer
ranks targets
and
determines
where and
when to
engage.
Targeting is
unseen and
unpredictable.

Act

Computer
decides when
and where to
execute.
Actions are
potentially
unpredictable
in time and
space.

74. Id. at 1 Itbl.1.
75. CLOUGH, supra note 46.
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Examples I Observe
I
Orient
I
Decide
Phalanx;
Computer
Computer
Computer
Patriot in
ranks targets
automatically
analyzes data
Automatic gathers data
utilizing
and
Mode;
based on
previously
determines
Israeli
previously
established
where and
"Harpy"
established
criteria but
when to
Countercriteria.
without any
engage within
Radar
is
Observation
contemporane previously
System
predictable.
ous human
established
input.
Information
parameters.
Analysis is
Targeting is
may be
provided to
predictable.
predictable.
human
controller.

[VOL. 6 9: 413

Act
Computer
decides to
execute based
on previously
established
parameters.
Actions are
generally
predictable in
time and
space.

.

Phoenix
over-thehorizon
missile;
Paladin
artillery;
Cruise
missiles;
MIA2
Abrams
tank

Computer
gathers data at
human
controller
direction.
Provides
simultaneous
information to
human
controller.

Computer
analyzes data
utilizing
previously
established
criteria.
Contemporan
eous human
input is
present.
Analysis is
Predictable.
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Computer
ranks targets,
but human
approval is
required.
Contemporan
eous human
input is
present.
Targeting is
predictable.

Computer
suggests
execution and
executes after
human
approval.
Human is
shadow for
contingencies.

14

Ford: Autonomous Weapons and International Law
2017]

Examples
Shortrange
artillery
(e.g.,
M1 14
155mm
howitzer)

AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

Orient
Information is
primarily
directed and
gathered by
human
controller.
Computer
gathers raw
information
for human
controller.

Orient
Human
controller
analyzes data
with
assistance
from
computer
systems.

Decide
Human ranks
targets and
determines
where and
when to
engage.

427

Act
Computer
executes on
human
command.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AUTONOMY

It is well accepted that the law of armed conflict applies to AEWs;
therefore, the law imposes requirements on parties to a conflict on their
use,76 including the requirement that the attack is discriminate,
proportional,78 and complies with requirements for precautions in attack. 79
However, the application of these concepts to autonomous weapons raises
some questions. For example, can an autonomous system distinguish civilian
from combatant? A civilian object from a military object? Can it do so in all
environments? Or, in the context of proportionality, how does an
autonomous system calculate and weigh anticipated military advantage and
expected collateral damage?
Some commentators contend these issues are insoluble, arguing that
AEWs cannot comply with the requirements because doing so requires

76. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICTS, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REP. No. 3 1IC/11/5.1.2, at 36 (2011)
("There can be no doubt that IHL applies to new weaponry and to the employment in warfare
of new technological developments . . . ."); Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 32, at 243 ("There
is universal consensus that the law of armed conflict applies to autonomous weapon
systems.").
77. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125

U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].
78. Id. art. 51(5)(b); id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii); see also OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., U.S. DEP'T OF
DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL

79.

¶ 5.12

(2015).

AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
428

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6 9: 413

inherently human judgments,80 the technology is not sufficiently
sophisticated," or the current legal regime is insufficient to address
autonomous weapons.8 2 This Article concludes-as have others8 3-that the
law of armed conflict is adequate to regulate autonomous weapons systems
that currently exist or will likely exist in the near future.
That said, it is perilous to think of AEWs as a homogenous category that
is either compliant with the law or not. Certain components of a given
system may be highly autonomous, while other elements may not have
autonomous features at all. Thus, asking whether autonomous weapons can
comply with the law is fundamentally the wrong question, since an answer
requires an impossible ex-ante judgment. To be clear, however, one could
examine a particular autonomous weapons system and make that
determination.
While this Section briefly discusses the impact of autonomy on the
triggers for non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and international
armed conflicts (IACs), it does not address the jus ad bellum and law of
neutrality issues that arise with the use of force by one State into the territory
of another. Further, the Article draws no distinction between IAC and NIAC
as the targeting provisions of the Additional Protocol I (API) to the Geneva
Conventions are analogous and accepted as reflecting the customary
international law applicable in both types of conflict. 84

80. Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights,
Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
687, 700-03 (2012).
81. See Noel Sharkey, Groundsfor Discrimination:Autonomous Robot Weapons, RUSI
DEFENCE SYSTEMS, Oct. 2008, at 86, 87; DOCHERTY, supra note 1, at 23; Stop Killer Robots
While We Still Can, PAX (Feb. 26, 1014), https://www.paxforpeace.nlstay-informed/news/sto
p-killer-robots-while-we-still-can.
82. Hin-Yan Liu, Categorization and Legality of Autonomous and Remote Weapons
Systems, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 627, 629 (2012).
83. See Kenneth Anderson et al., Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous
Weapon Systems, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 386, 387 (2014); Markus Wagner, The Dehumanizationof
International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and Political Implications of Autonomous
Weapons Systems, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1371, 1386 (2014); Peter Margulies, Making
Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal
Force in Armed Conflicts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REMOTE WARFARE 1 (Jens David
Ohlin ed., 2016).
84. See Michael N. Schmitt & Eric W. Widmar, "On Target": Precisionand Balance in
the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 379, 381 (The U.S., Israel,
"and other non-party states consider nearly all the treaty's targeting provisions as reflective of
customary international law."); Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dep't of State,
Remarks on the United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions at the Sixth Annual American Red
Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 22,
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CircumstancesNot ImplicatingLOAC

Arguments concerning autonomy and the law of armed conflict (LOAC)
tend to focus on a limited subset of potential engagements, specifically those
engagements involving fully autonomous systems using deadly force against
a person in cluttered and complex battlespaces. 5 Unquestionably, conflicts
will be fought in these environments and will raise significant issues
regarding the employment of autonomous weapons systems. As discussed
below, conflicts will also, however, be fought in ways and in environments
that will not raise issues in the law of armed conflict because of the way
autonomy is used and the context or manner in which it is used.
For example, systems may employ autonomy in technologies that do not
implicate the law of armed conflict. The U.S. RQ-4 "Global Hawk" is an
unarmed/unmanned surveillance aircraft that can autonomously refuel 86 and
navigate- 7 functions that do not implicate the law of armed conflict."
Looking to the proposed framework definition of autonomy presented
above, the concerns raised by opponents of AEWs are only potentially
present in the "decide" and "act" aspects of machine decision making, and
then only in the higher order systems (e.g., Tier IV and III).89
It is also possible to employ weapons that are fully autonomous but are
employed in an environment that does not raise issues with some aspects of
the law of armed conflict. For example, an autonomous weapon could be
used in a very limited area (e.g., a remote desert battlefield) or in a very
limited fashion (e.g., a weapon activates for a fraction of a second at a time
when no civilians are present). 90 In such circumstances, aspects of the law of
armed conflict, such as proportionality, may not be implicated.

1987), in 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 426-27 (1987) (describing the Protocol I sections
that deserve recognition as customary international law); see generally 1 JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005) (discussing certain elements of Protocol I that

are accepted as customary international law).
85. See e.g., DOCHERTY, supra note 1, at 30; Heyns, supra note 31, at 13.
86. Autonomous High-Altitude Refueling, DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY,
http://www.darpa.mil/about-us/timeline/autonomous-highaltitude-refueling (last visited Nov.
10, 2017).
87. See Monroe Conner, NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: Global Hawk High-Altitude
Long-Endurance Science Aircraft, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/centers/armstrong/news/Fact
Sheets/FS-098-DFRC.html (last updated Aug. 4, 2017).
88. Though autonomous navigation would implicate other areas of the law such as
sovereignty and the law of neutrality.
89. See infra Part III.
90. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 32, at 246 (noting that some systems might be
lawful in some circumstances but not others).
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Finally, an autonomous weapon could be employed that is highly
autonomous but then used in a manner that does not implicate the law of
armed conflict. For example, consider a hypothetical weapon directed to
attack a particular building. Before activation, the system is programmed to
deactivate when any civilians are present. This process would be akin to an
artillery round that can turn itself off when civilians are detected. Here, the
autonomous feature of the system (e.g., the decision to deactivate) is being
used in a manner that does not generate issues under the law of armed
conflict, and in fact, can only cause enhanced compliance.
B. Armed Conflict Triggers and Autonomy
The existence of an IAC is determined based on the criteria established
in Common Article 2, which applies the Conventions "to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties ... ." 91 The official ICRC commentary
notes that an armed conflict extends to "any difference arising between two
States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces .

. .

. It

makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter
takes place." 92 This view has found widespread 93 but not universal
acceptance. 94

Autonomous technologies are unlikely to affect the triggers for IACs. In
the hands of a State, an autonomous weapon system, like a non-autonomous
weapon system, is merely an instrument for the exercise of State authority.
Even where the system is acting with extreme levels of autonomy, it is-at

91. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I];
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter GC IV].
92. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE
FIELD 32 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952).

93. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94- 1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, T 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995) (endorsing the view that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed
force between States").
94. See, e.g., INT'L LAW Ass'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (2010) ("The Committee, however, found little evidence
to support the view that the Conventions apply in the absence of fighting of some intensity.").
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most-an organ or agent of the State whose actions are attributable to the
State. 95 Actions will be attributable even where the system is acting in an
entirely unpredictable manner and beyond the scope of the initial
deployment. 96

The effect of autonomy on NIACs, however, is somewhat different.
Like IACs, there is no internationally accepted definition of an NIAC,
though Additional Protocol II describes what does not constitute an NIAC;
specifically, "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature." 97 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's (ICTY)
extensive treatment of the subject in the Prosecutorv. Tadit case is widely
considered the definitive exposition on the issue. 98 In Tadit, the Appeals
Chamber found that an NIAC exists when there is a situation of "protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State." 99
The first prong of the Tadit test requires sufficiently intense violence. 0 0
While Tadit speaks to "protracted armed violence," in practice the intensity
of the violence rather than the length of the violence has come to be
regarded as the focus of the test. 0' In another case, the ICTY provided a list
of "indicative factors" which can be used to evaluate the intensity criteria,
including the following:
the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the
type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and
calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces
partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of

95. Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/83, at pt. 1, ch. II, art. 4 (2001) [hereinafter
Articles].
96. Id. at pt. I, ch. II, art. 7.
97. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (NIACs exclude
"situations of internal disturbance and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence or other acts of a similar nature.").
98. Tadit, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶70.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) ("The criterion of protracted armed violence has
therefore been interpreted in practice, including by the Tadit Trial Chamber itself, as referring
more to the intensity of the armed violence than to its duration.").
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material destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat
zones. 102
The organizational element of ICTY jurisprudence requires that the
organized armed group that is a party to the conflict have a level of
organization and a command structure capable of sustaining military
operations. 103 The court relies on various criteria to determine whether a
group is sufficiently organized.1 04 In examining whether the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) was sufficiently organized, the ICTY utilized the
following criteria:
level of organization of the KLA: the existence of KLA
headquarters and command structure; the existence of KLA
disciplinary rules and mechanisms; territorial control exerted by the
KLA; the ability of the KLA to gain access to weapons and other
military equipment; to recruit members; to provide them with
military training; to carry out military operations and use tactics and
strategy; and to speak with one voice. 0 5
Sasha Radin and Jason Coats have expressly addressed the question of
how autonomy might impact the trigger for an NIAC.1 06 In an analysis with
which this author agrees, Radin and Coats argue that autonomous weapons
have a direct bearing on the organization criteria in that they enable an
armed group to inflict violence and control territory with a much smaller
organizational structure than would be required using conventional
weapons.1 07 A single combatant could control dozens of autonomous
weapons systems, which could replace hundreds or thousands of combatants.
Further, autonomy simplifies an armed group's logistics and streamlines
command and control,'s allowing much smaller, more loosely organized

102. Id
103. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, How IS THE TERM "ARMED CONFLICT" DEFINED
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 3 (2008); see also Dapo Akande, Classificationof
Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 51 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012) ("In order to be a party
to an armed conflict a non-state group must have a certain level of organization with a
command structure.").

104. Akande, supra note 103, at 51-52.
105. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, ¶ 64.
106. Sasha Radin & Jason Coats, Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Threshold of

Non-InternationalArmed Conflict, 30 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 133, 134 (2016).
107. Id at 143-47.
108. Id at 144-45.
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groups to inflict levels of violence that previously would necessitate large,
highly organized groups.1 09 The court in Tadit likely did not consider the
circumstance where a minuscule, potentially highly decentralized, non-state
actor would have the ability to engage in violence on the scale of an armed
conflict.
Regarding the intensity prong of the Tadit test, Radin and Coats note
that "[a]s systems replace humans, the forms that armed clashes take could
be altered, resulting in an increase in destruction and possible decrease in
loss of life.""1 0 Thus, autonomous systems could be highly sophisticated and
programmed to avoid civilian casualties. The resulting engagements could
be extremely violent regarding damage to objects but result in no loss of life.
Would such an engagement trigger the Tadit intensity criteria? While no
clear answer exists, the question prompts consideration of the value ascribed
to the various indicia of intensity. Where human lives are valued more than
the destruction of property, a conflict with substantial loss of property could
occur without triggering an armed conflict. Conversely, "if destruction were
to be accorded the same weight as human life, [then this] could lead to an
extreme situation where, for example, intense clashes between AWS could
satisfy the intensity requirement, and thus trigger an armed conflict (if the
organization criterion was also satisfied)" without any loss of human life."
C. Distinction
Distinction requires a person conducting the attack to distinguish
between lawful targets (combatants, civilians taking direct part in the
hostilities, and military objectives) from unlawful targets (civilians, those
hors de combat, civilian objects, and other protected persons and objects).112
The International Court of Justice has described the principle of distinction
as one of the two "cardinal principles" that constitute "the fabric of
humanitarian law."" 3 Together these principles reflect "intransgressible
principles of international customary law."11 4 Article 48 expresses this
principle in Additional Protocol I:

109. Id at 141.
110. Id at 148.
111. Id at 149.
112. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(2)(a)(1) (The article requires the
attacker "do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilian
nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives.").
113. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8, 1996).
114. Id ¶79.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
434

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6 9: 413

In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all
times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants
and between civilian objects and military objectives and
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
"

objectives.

Article 48 reflects customary international law, as does the relevant
provision of Additional Protocol 11116 that establishes the same restrictions in
NIACs." 7
There are aspects of distinction that may prove particularly challenging
for an autonomous weapons system. While distinguishing a uniformed
combatant from a civilian is relatively easy, distinguishing a civilian from a
civilian directly participating in hostilities, in many circumstances, may be
very difficult. Determining when the direct participation begins and ends is
more difficult still. Similarly, determining membership in an organized
armed group could prove challenging for an autonomous weapons system.
1.

Distinction with Respect to Persons

The civilian population is comprised of all persons"' who are not
members of the armed forces.11 9 Parties to the conflict are enjoined from
attacking 20 civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."121 Combatants include members of the armed forces of a
State;1 22 members of a militia or volunteer corps that belong to a State;1 23
and members of a levie en masse.124 Additional Protocol I further extends

AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. I, art. 48.
AP II, supra note 97, art. 13.3.
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 84, at 3, 25.
AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. II, art. 50(2).
GC IV, supra note 91, art. 4; AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. II, art. 50(1);
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 84, at 17.
120. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. I, art. 48; MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 288 (1982).
121. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. I, art. 51(3).
122. Id., art. 43(2); OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, ¶ 4.3.3.
123. GC III, supra note 91, art. 4(2); OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, ¶ 4.3; see also
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 22 (2009) ("[A]ll armed actors

showing a sufficient degree of military organization and belonging to a party to the conflict
must be regarded as part of the armed forces of that party.") [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE].

124. GC III, supra note 91, art. 4(2); OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supranote 78,
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the definition of combatants for States party to include members of
organized armed groups that fulfill the criteria outlined in Additional
Protocol I, Article 43.125 Combatants may be targeted based solely on their
status.1 26 In both IACs and NIACs, members of organized armed groups are
regarded as distinct from civilians for targeting purposes.1 27 Which members
of an organized armed group can be targeted remains a matter of some
debate. 128
As noted above, issues relating to distinction and autonomy only arise in
a very specific subset of engagements-attacks involving autonomous
technologies selecting and engaging targets where civilians or civilian
objects, or those that are hors de combat, are potentially present. Broadly,
autonomy implicates two issues related to the principle of distinction. The
first arises from the length of time the system is deployed, whereas the
second derives from the inherent technological sophistication of autonomous
systems.
Autonomy allows systems to potentially be deployed for extended
periods of time.1 29 The U.S. "Global Hawk" unmanned surveillance aircraft,
for example, can autonomously operate for more than thirty hours.1 30 The
U.S. Army is currently developing a system, the Persistent Aerial
Reconnaissance and Communications System, which can stay aloft for an

125. AP I, supra note 77, pt. III, § 1, ch. II, art. 43(1) ("The armed forces of a Party to a
conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by
a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.").
126. See, e.g., AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. I, art. 48; OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra
note 78, T 5.7.2.
127. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 84, at 385 ("Consensus has emerged in the past
decade as to another group of individuals who do not qualify as civilians for the purpose of
targeting members of 'organized armed groups."'); see also OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra
note 78, T 5.8.3 ("Like members of an enemy State's armed forces, individuals who are
formally or functionally part of a non-State armed group that is engaged in hostilities may be
made the object of attack because they likewise share in their group's hostile intent.").
128. See Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The
ConstitutiveElements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 704 (2010) (arguing that all members
of an organized armed group may be targeted regardless of their function in the group). But see
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 123, at 71 (noting that only members of the group who
serve a "continuous combat fimction" can be targeted at any time).
129. In 2010, Boeing reported that an experimental unmanned aerial vehicle dubbed the
Phantom Eye can loiter for up to ten days. Michael Barkoviak, Boeing UA V Able to Loiter
Above Target for 10 Days, DAILY TECH (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.dailytech.com/
Boeing+UAV+Able+to+Loiter+Above+Target+For+10+Days/articlel9242.htm.
130. Autonomous Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System Suppresses 200,000 Flight
Hours, NORTHROP GRUMMAN (July 26, 2016), http://news.northropgrumman.com/news/
releases/autonomous-global-hawk-unmanned-aircraft-system-surpasses-200-000-flight-hours.
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indefinite amount of time if it maintains a power supply connection with a
ground station. 131 The longer the system operates, the greater the chance the
environment will change. Changes can occur in the physical environment
(e.g., atmospheric conditions, altitude, time of day, weather, etc.) and in the
operational environment (e.g., the human element of the battlefield including
the persons and human-made structures).
The interaction between environment and machine is critical, as the
ability of a system to distinguish is a function of the sophistication of the
system and the complexity of the environment. An increasingly complex
environment requires an increasingly sophisticated system. 132
Autonomy raises various issues with the rule of distinction in the
context of attacks on persons.1 33 It is not inconceivable that a system could
be programmed to identify members of an armed force.1 34 They are, after all,
required to take measures to ensure that they are readily distinguishable from
civilians.1 35 An AEW could be easily programmed to identify a particular
uniform or insignia. Identifying a civilian who is directly participating in
hostilities may be more difficult since the civilian will likely not exhibit any
outward indication of the civilian's status, and may, in fact, be attempting to
hide his or her status. For these reasons, identifying a civilian directly
participating is challenging for both humans and machines.

131. The Future of High-PoweredCommercial Drones, CYPHY, http://cyphyworks.com/
parc/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
132. See, e.g., U.S. NAVAL METEOROLOGY AND OCEANOGRAPHY PROF'L DEV.
DETACHMENT ATLANTIC, ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS ON EO SENSORS AND SYSTEMS (2005)

(providing a detailed discussion of atmospheric effects on various types of electro-optical
sensors); see also RICHARD C. SHIRKEY & BARBARA J. SAUTER, ARMY RESEARCH LAB. REP.,
WEATHER EFFECTS ON TARGET ACQUISITION PART I: SENSOR PERFORMANCE MODEL
INFRARED ALGORITHMS 1 (2001) ("Detection and recognition ranges depend upon the target

and background characteristics, atmospheric propagation, and senor performance."); The UK
Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, UK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEVELOPMENT,
CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE CENTRE, JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11, 5-4 (Mar. 30, 2011) ("[F]or

operating environments with easily distinguished targets in low clutter environments, a degree
of autonomous operation is probably achievable now and data from programmes such as
Brimstone and ALARM, for example, would have direct read-across.").
133. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. II, art. 52(2).
134. See Matthew Rosenberg & John Markoff, The Pentagon's "Terminator
Conundrum": Robots That Could Kill on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), https://ww
w.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html
(describing
recent U.S. military tests of an autonomous drone which "showed a spooky ability to discern
soldier from civilian, and to fluidly shift course and move in on objects it could not quickly
identify. Armed with a variation of human and facial recognition software used by American
intelligence agencies, the drone adroitly tracked moving cars and picked out enemies hiding
along walls").
135. Annex to the Convention No. IV Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Regulations, § I, ch. I, art. I, ¶ 2, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. 539.
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In an attempt to provide more concrete guidance on civilians directly
participating in hostilities, the ICRC has suggested a three-part cumulative
test of "constitutive elements." This formulation has found widespread
supportl and holds that:
Acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities must meet three
cumulative requirements: (1) a threshold regarding the harm likely
to result from the act, (2) a relationship of direct causation between
the act and the expected harm, and (3) a belligerent nexus between
the act and the hostilities conducted between the parties to an armed
conflict. 137
Protection against attack is lost for the period of time a civilian takes
direct part in hostilities. 138
Determining the contours of "for such time" has proven difficult. Most
agree that the direct participation in hostilities extends for some point in time
before and after the participation in hostilities, but identifying the moment
direct participation begins and ends has proved elusive.1 39 In the ICRC's
interpretive guidance, the individual's direct participation extends to
preparatory measures and deployment to and from the location of the act.1 40
An alternative view holds that "for such time" should be extended "as far
before and after a hostile action as a causal connection existed."14' The
United States' position is that persons taking direct part in hostilities are a
legitimate target until "they have permanently ceased their participation" in
hostilities. 142
AEWs will likely face significant difficulty in identifying a person
immediately before the act constituting a direct participation in hostilities.
To be clear, this does not render "autonomous weapons" as a class of

136. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 84, at 387 ("The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance, in
an approach that has been widely accepted, suggests that acts of direct participation consist of
three cumulative constitutive elements.").
137. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 123, at 46.

138. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. II, art. 51(3).
139. Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 5, 36 (2010)
[hereinafter Schmitt, Interpretive].
140. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 123, at 65.

141. Schmitt, Interpretive, supra note 139, at 36-37 (citing Yoram Dinstein, Distinction
and the Loss of Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, in 84 INT'L L. STUD. 183, 189-90
(Michael D. Carsten ed., 2008)); see also Kenneth H. Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force:A
Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 17
(2004).
142. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78,
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weapons indiscriminate; rather, it limits the type and employment of
weapons systems. Take for example a civilian who is emplacing an
improvised explosive device (IED) along a road. An AEW could plausibly
be deployed with radar that can detect a person digging along a road 43 and a
spectrograph that can detect the chemical signature of explosives.1 44 Assume
the system has been programmed to engage a target when these detection
criteria are met and no other persons are present.
Under the ICRC interpretative guidance,1 45 the individual can be
engaged as they deploy and redeploy from the act. Thus, an autonomous
weapon could continue to track the person until no civilians are present and
then engage. The ICRC guidance allows that such a person remains a direct
participant in hostilities until they have "physically separated from the
operation."1 46 This determination "depends on a multitude of situational
factors, which cannot be comprehensively described in abstract terms" and
"must be made with utmost care and based on a reasonable evaluation of the
prevailing circumstances."1 47 This guidance is difficult to operationalize for
commanders and soldiers on the ground, and even more so for programmers
of an autonomous weapons system. The problem, however, is not
insurmountable.
There are four control mechanisms that commanders could employ to
ensure AEWs comply with the law of armed conflict. These mechanismsbriefly described as Sophistication, Restriction, Updates, and Human
Involvement-address concerns about the use of force in unclear
circumstances. In the context of direct participation in hostilities, the
mechanisms would be applied as such:
*

Sophistication: Deploying an AEW that is of such advanced
technological sophistication that it can identify direct participants with
reasonable certainty. In the above example, such a system could be

143. See Sevgi Zubeyde Gurbuz et al., Comparison of Radar-BasedHuman Detection
Techniques, GA. TECH RESEARCH INST. (June 2010) (describing radar-based technology that
can remotely identify humans), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a523514.pdf
144. See Ida Johnson, FOI, Swedish Def. Research Agency, Presentation on Stand-off
Raman Spectroscopy for the Detection of Explosives, http://www.vtt.fi/files/newsletter/os/
042013/IdaJohansson.pdf (demonstrating the feasibility of a stand-off spectrometer that can
detect the chemical signature of explosives); see also Ruth M. Doherty, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Security, Presentation on Science & Technology to Counter Improvised Explosive
Devices (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2010GlobalExplosive/Doherty.pdf
(describing a U.S. program to develop technology to remotely detect explosives on a person).
145. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 123, at 65.

146. Id. at 67.
147. Id. at 68.
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programmed to determine when using the ICRC language-a person
is physically separated from the operation.
*

Restriction: Limiting the AEW's geographical boundaries of operation,
duration of the deployment, or target set/type such that the issue of
direct participation will not arise. This is most easily accomplished by
deploying the system for a discrete task or for a very short period.

*

Updates: Updating the AEW with human-identified direct participants.

*

Human Involvement: Retaining operator control or oversight of the
AEW during deployment. This would include humans on, in, or near the
loop.

Strictly speaking, one could argue that the latter two control
mechanisms would render the system something other than autonomous,
particularly where the control is significant. Most AEWs would likely use a
combination of these control mechanisms. For example, a system might be
deployed to a small operational area (Restriction) and be further
programmed only to engage targets provided by a human operator (Human
Involvement) based upon current intelligence (Updates).
2.

DistinctionBetween Objects

Another aspect of distinction that autonomy potentially disrupts is the
targeting of objects. Article 52(1) of Additional Protocol I prohibits targeting
civilian objects, which are defined as all objects which "are not military
objectives."1 48 The article provides a two-part test for military objectives.
First, they must "by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action" and secondly, their "total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage."1 49 Effective contribution is a broad
concept that "does not require a direct connection with combat
5
operation[s]."

1o

148. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. II, art. 52(1).
149. Id. at pt. IV, § 1, ch. II, art. 52(2).
150. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 5.7.6.2 ("The object must make or be
intended to make an effective contribution to military action; however, this contribution need
not be 'direct' or 'proximate."') (citing BOTHE ET AL., supra note 120, at 324) ("[A] civilian
object may become a military objective and thereby lose its immunity from deliberate attack
through use which is only indirectly related to combat action, but which nevertheless provides
an effective contribution to the military phase of a Party's overall war effort.").
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An object is a military objective by nature when its "intrinsic character"
is military.'"' The ICRC commentary provides a non-exhaustive list
including "all objects directly used by the armed forces: weapons,
equipment, transports, fortifications, depots, buildings occupied by armed
forces, staff headquarters, communications centres etc." 5 2 Autonomy likely
does not have a significant impact on military objects by their nature since
these objects are usually readily identifiable, can be programmed into an
AEW, and are not likely to lose their status.
An object is a military objective by location when the location of the
object provides an effective military contribution regardless of the use of the
object. 5 3 A strategic bridge that affords enemy forces freedom of movement
would be a valid military object by location regardless of how the bridge is
used at the time of the attack. Again, autonomy has little impact on objects
that are military by their location. As with intrinsically military objects,
objects that are military by location can be identified and programmed into
an autonomous system. Depending on the scope of autonomy, the system
could then select targets from among the potential targets. Changes to the
operational environment do not change the status of such objects-changes
may, however, affect the military advantage calculation discussed below.
The military purpose of an object speaks to its future use. 14 The DoD
Law of War Manual provides runways at civilian airports' as an example,
and Yoram Dinstein uses civilian cruise ships that could be used as troop
transports. 5 6 Designating an object a military objective by its purpose
requires an understanding of the adversary's intent based on a knowledge of
the enemy's tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and current
intelligence showing enemy activity. This determination is more than
supposition, and must be supported with reasonable certainty that the object
will be converted to military use. As Yoram Dinstein cautions, often this
evaluation is "crisply clear" while other situations "are not so easy to
decipher.""'

151. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 96 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
152. Yves Sandoz et al., Commentary, Additional Protocols of 8 June 1997 to the
Geneva Conventions of]2 August 1949, ¶ 2020 (1987).
153. Id. ¶ 2021 ("Clearly, there are objects which by their nature have no military
function but which, by virtue of their location, make an effective contribution to military
action.").
154. Id. ¶ 2022 ("The criterion of 'purpose' is concerned with the intended future use of
an object, while that of 'use' is concerned with its present function.").
155. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 5.7.6.1.
156. DINSTEIN, supra note 151, at 99-100.

157. Id.
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AEWs may have difficulty making determinations as to when an object
qualifies as a military objective by its purpose. Such a determination would
require a system that can sense enemy activity and make targeting
determinations about the enemy's future actions. Take a hypothetical where
reliable intelligence indicates enemy forces are redirecting all aluminum to
military purposes. Conceivably, an AEW could be sufficiently sophisticated
to recognize all aluminum stock is being redirected to military installations.
This level of sophistication is, however, unlikely given current technology.
More likely, the system would have to be deployed with the information or
provided an update regarding the status of the stock. Absent such updates, it
is hard to conceive how an AEW could make sophisticated determinations
regarding the future use of something.
An object is a valid military object by its use when the current function
of a previously civilian object is now military in nature."' The object
remains a valid military objective for such time as the object is used for
military purposes.15 9 This category of military object is analog to the
principle that a civilian remains a civilian until and for such time that they
directly participate in hostilities. 160 As with the targeting of civilians directly
participating in hostilities, measures would have to be taken to ensure
objects are attacked only during the time that they are military objectives.
Determining the point in time when a civilian object becomes a military
object, and when it regains its civilian status, may prove difficult depending
on the circumstances. It is relatively clear, for instance, when a school is
being used as a fighting position. Conversely, it is relatively unclear when a
school is being used as a military headquarters. Whether an autonomous
system can determine when an object is no longer being used for military
purposes is a technical question. In some circumstances, this determination
might be simple and could be made with current technology. More complex
scenarios would necessitate more sophisticated systems or programming the
system such that it is not permitted to make these determinations.
3.

Doubt as to Status of the Target

Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I holds that where there is "doubt
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a

158. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 5.7.6.1. (."Use' refers to the object's present
function.").
159. HENCKAERTS & DOSwALD-BECK, supra note 84, at 35; see also OFF. OF GEN.
COUNS., supra note 78, T 5.7.6.1.
160. DINSTEIN, supra note 151, at 98.
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civilian."16' Article 52(3) provides an analog provision in situations where
there is doubt as to whether an object that is "normally dedicated to civilian
purposes ... is being used to make an effective contribution to military
action ... . "162 It is not clear whether these provisions reflect customary
international law.1 63 Though the United States rejects the customary nature
of these provisions,1 64 the DoD Law of War Manual requires decisions to be
made in good faith based on something more than "merely hypothetical or
speculative considerations."1 65
Can machines be programmed to account for doubt?1 66 In a lengthy
report commissioned by the DoD, noted roboticist Ronald Arkin argues that
systems could be programmed with an "ethical governor" bounding the
actions of a system within predetermined limits.1 67 Such bounds could be

programmed to consider uncertainty, which can be expressed "in a variety of
ways: discrete (e.g., binary: absent or present; categorical: absent, weak,
medium, strong) or it can be real valued and continuous."1 68 How then does
one quantify doubt on the battlefield? Clearly, the easiest circumstance is
where the machine is programmed to consider doubt as a binary function:
either the system is 100% certain and attacks, or it is less than 100% certain
and refrains from attacking. The law, however, requires only reasonable, not
absolute, certainty.1 69 Quantifying reasonable certainty is inherently more
subjective; mathematically, what constitutes "reasonable certainty" is
unclear.
Compliance with distinction will depend on the complexity of the
environment in which the AEWs are operating. Systems displaying a large
amount of autonomy are today employed in uncluttered environments (e.g.,
the open sea) against readily identified targets (e.g., an incoming missile).
Difficulties arise when AEWs operate in dynamic circumstances or in
situations that require contextual decisions. As others have correctly noted,
"it is conceivable that the battlefield situation might be too cluttered for the
system to accurately distinguish between military objectives and civilian

161. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, §1, ch. II, art. 50(1).
162. Id. at pt. IV, § 1, ch. III, art. 52(3).
163. See Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 84, at 197 ("Under customary international law,
no legal presumption of civilian status exists for persons or objects.").
164. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78,

T 5.1.2.

165. Id. ¶ 5.5.3.2.
166. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 32, at 263.
167. RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 127
(CRC Press ed., 2009).
168. Id. at 59.
169. See OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78,
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objects or between combatants and the civilian population. In those cases, an
autonomous weapons system would be unlawful to use." 7 1
D. Proportionality
The object of an attack must be not only a legitimate object of attack,
but the attack itself must comply with the rule of proportionality, which
prohibits an "attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated."'17 Proportionality is widely considered to be
a norm of customary international law in both IACs and NIACs.1 72
Determining anticipated military advantage and the expected collateral
damage and then weighing these unlike values against one another is both
subjective and contextual and therefore can be difficult for the most skilled
humans, let alone computer systems.1 73
Proportionality operates only to protect civilians and civilian objects.1 74
Where there is no danger of collateral damage, the principle is not
implicated. ' Similarly, proportionality is read to apply to loss of life,
injury, and damage to civilian objects and thus would not extend to prohibit
attacks that harass or inconvenience.1 76 It is equally important to consider

170. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Means and Methods of the Future: Autonomous Systems, in
TARGETING: THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN WARFARE 188 (Paul A.L. Ducheine, Michael N.

Scmitt, & Frans P.B. Osinga eds., 2016); see also Marco Sass6li, Autonomous Weapons and
InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to
be Clarified, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 308, 320 (2014) ("If it is technically not feasible to respect
certain requirements of IHL with autonomous weapons, this is not a sufficient reason for
abandoning those requirements. The use of autonomous weapons in such cases is simply
unlawful.").
171. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(2)(iii); see also id. at pt. IV, § 1, ch.
IV, art. 51(5)(b) ("[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.").
172. HENCKAERTS & DosWALD-BECK, supra note 84, Rule 14, at 46.
173. See generally Thurnher, supra note 170.
174. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 51(5)(b).
175. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 5.12.1 ("In conducting attacks, the
proportionality rule only need be applied when civilians or civilian objects are at risk of harm
from attacks on military objectives. It would not apply when civilians or civilian objects are
not at risk."); DINSTEIN, supra note 151, at 129 ("Proportionality has nothing to do with injury
to combatants or damage to military objectives.").
176. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 5.12.2 (citing Yoram Dinstein, Distinction
and Loss of Civilian Protection in InternationalArmed Conflicts, 84 INT'L L. STUD. 183, 186
(2008)); cf WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 370 (2012).
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that the principle does not require an equitable balancing between military
advantage and collateral damage; rather, an attack would violate this section
only where the collateral damage is "excessive" relative to the "concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated."'
In this context, "concrete and direct" indicates that the military
advantage should be "substantial and relatively close" to the attack.17 1 It
need not be instantaneous,1 79 though a "remote advantage to be gained at
some unknown time in the future would not be a proper consideration to
weigh against civilian losses."'s The law does not require that the decision
to attack be made with a perfect awareness of the direct or indirect and
immediate or long-term consequences of the attack.'"' Rather,
[i]n determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary
to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the
circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of
the information available to him or her, could have expected
excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack. 182
What then constitutes a "reasonably well-informed person"? The U.S.
military's joint targeting doctrine suggests considering "a mix of empirical
data, probability, historical observations, and complex modeling" to estimate
collateral damage.1 83 Computer systems (autonomous or conventional) are
especially suited for this analysis. Computers can process large volumes of
data relevant to a proportionality analysis, including the nature and
destructive effects of various weapons systems, the composition and
durability of buildings near the target, the probability of civilian presence
based on historical data, and more.' 8 4 Thus, the collateral damage aspect is
unlikely to cause significant issues for an AEW.

177. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
178. Sandoz et al., supra note 152, ¶ 2209.
179. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78,

T 5.12.5

("There is no requirement that the

military advantage be 'immediate."').
180. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 120, at 365.
181. See Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003).
182. Id.
183. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CHAIRMAN OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION D-1 (2009), https://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/

dod/drone_dod_3160_01.pdf.
184. Id. at D-2 ("[T]he CDM's science and art provide essential information that the
commander uses in context with other factors and sound judgment. . . .").
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Determining military advantage, however, is particularly challenging for
AEWs because the evaluation is contextual and dynamic and does not lend
itself to a mathematically precise calculation.'8 5 Military advantage must be
calculated "in the circumstances ruling at the time."186 This calculation
requires an understanding of the military value of the target, including the
contribution the item is making to the enemy in the circumstances of the
time, and the benefit that will accrue from its neutralization or damage.
Autonomy (potentially) expands the time between activation and
engagement of the target, allowing for extended loiter times. During this
period, it is possible for the military advantage to change. For example, on a
large battlefield, the destruction of a single unarmed bridging vehicle would
provide little military advantage. If, however, that bridging vehicle is being
used, or is about to be used, to facilitate the advance of hundreds of enemy
vehicles, then the military advantage of its destruction increases over time.
Marco Sass6li has identified this area of the law as "the most serious
[international humanitarian law] argument against the even theoretical
possibility of deploying weapons that remain fully autonomous over
considerable periods of time." 8 7 Sass6li suggests that autonomous weapons
could not apply proportionality unless "constantly updated about military
operations and plans.""' This suggestion is insightful and deserves
additional consideration.
If one employs a weapon that is "fully autonomous" for a
"considerable" period of time, a mechanism for receiving updates on
changes to the military advantage will likely be needed. This does not
necessarily mean "constant" updates. Even on today's modern, fast-moving
battlefield, the military advantage of some targets remains fairly static. The
military advantage of an enemy's headquarters, for instance, will likely
remain fairly constant throughout a battle. An AEW could likely be
deployed against such an objective without significant proportionality
concerns. Where the circumstances are dynamic, however, the challenges
become more acute.
Consider a hypothetical battle involving three enemy tank battalions (A,
B, and C) each with fifty-eight tanks. Before the engagement, a friendly
forces commander will develop an operational framework that is a
mechanism to frame their "concept of operations in time, space, purpose,

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. III, art. 52(2).
Sass61i, supra note 170, at 332.
Id.
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and resources." 8 9 One operational framework methodology is to designate
primary and secondary efforts.' 90 In this example, the commander designates
the destruction of Battalion A as the primary effort, and the destruction of
Battalions B and C as supporting efforts. Target tanks in enemy Battalion A
would then have a greater military advantage than tanks in B and C. The
AEWs participating in the battle (AEW A, AEW B, and AEW C) would be
programmed with the value of tanks in each battalion. This example assumes
individual tanks in each battalion are fungible and would carry the same
military advantage value as another tank but for the commander's
designation to the contrary.
Tanks will be destroyed as the battle progresses. Consequentially, the
military advantage of a single tank would increase as the overall number of
tanks decreases. How then, could AEW A, which is targeting Battalion A,
know that the number of tanks in Battalion B have decreased, thus
increasing the relative value of each tank in Battalion A? Here again,
consider the control mechanisms of the autonomous weapons system.
*

Sophistication of the System: In this example, the AEW systems could
detect and react to changes in the military advantage. Thus, AEW A/B/C
would be connected to each other or could observe attrition rates across
the battlefield and calculate changes to the military advantage.

*

Restrictions on Use: AEW A could be deployed for a short period of
time or with restricted operational parameters (e.g., destroy five tanks
and return). The military advantage is unlikely to change in these
limited circumstances.

*

Availability of Updates: AEW A would be updated by human operators
regarding the status of the tanks in Battalion B and C.

*

Human Control: Retaining operator control or oversight of the system
during deployment. This would include humans on, in, or near the loop.

Proportionality is unquestionably a potential challenge for the lawful
operation of autonomous weapons, particularly in dynamic circumstances or
where the systems are deployed for long periods of time where the military
advantage is likely to change. Lawful use of autonomous systems in such
complex situations would require careful consideration of how systems

189. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,
OPERATIONS T47, at 11 (2011).
190. See id.

TT

ARMY

DOCTRINE PUBLICATION

3-0, UNIFIED

LAND

58-60.
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would account for changes in the military advantage. The control
mechanisms set forth above provide a framework through which operators
could ensure the lawful employment of autonomous weapons systems.
E. Precautions in Attack
Persons conducting attacks with autonomous weapons systems must
take feasible precautions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other
protected persons and objects.191 For States party to Additional Protocol I,
this requirement appears in Article 57, which requires "constant care" to be
taken to "spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects."1 92 The
Additional Protocol requirement applies to "[t]hose who plan or decide upon
an attack,"' 93 including commanders who make the decision to employ a
weapon system on the battlefield and those staff officers who plan the
employment of the weapon system."1

94

A distinction should be made here between echelons of command.
Armed conflict is typically conducted at three levels of war strategic,
operational, and tactical.195 Strategic operations synchronize instruments of
power to achieve overall objectives, while operational-level operations plan
and implement strategies and campaigns designed to employ tactical forces
to achieve strategic objectives.1 96 Tactical operations concern the
employment of forces on the battlefield.1 97 The duty to take constant care
attaches to tactical-level commanders and planners as they have the means to
control the application of force, and the intelligence to determine if constant
care is being taken during the course of an operation.1 98 In the context of

191. See OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78,

T 5.11.

192. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(a)(1).
193. Id. at pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(a)(2).
194. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 120, at 362 ("[Article 57] imposes three distinct duties on
commanders who decide upon attacks and staff officers who plan an attack . . . ." ); see also
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 34, at 166 ("[T]he duty of care requires commanders and all
others involved in the operations to be continuously sensitive . . . ."); PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE Rule 34 (2009) ("Constant care must be taken by

all those involved in planning, ordering and executing air or missile combat operations to spare
the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.").
195. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT
PUBLICATION 3-0, JoINT OPERATIONS 1-12 (2011) [hereinafter JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0].

196. Id. at 1-13 to 1-14.
197. Id. at 1-14.
198. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 120, at 363.
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AEWs, this would include the commander who orders the activation of the
AEW and the planners and staff who execute the commander's order.1 99
Neither the Protocol nor ICRC commentary to Article 57 defines
constant care, but by its plain meaning, it creates something more than a
one-time obligation. 200 That is to say, it would be insufficient to take
constant care when the weapon is deployed but ignore the weapon as it
loiters for months. In the cyber context, the Tallinn Manual notes that the
duty of care "requires commanders and all others involved in the operations
to be continuously sensitive to the effects of their activities on the civilian
population and civilian objects, and to seek to avoid any unnecessary effects
thereon." 20' An analog obligation should be read into the employment of
AEWs.
Article 57(2) further requires that those who "plan or decide upon an
attack ... [d]o everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special
protection but are military objectives . . . ."202 In this context, the
interpretation of what is "feasible" should be a "matter of common sense and
good faith."

203

In discussing precautions in attack, the military targeting process
provides a useful framework in which to consider the requirements. Modem
military practice distinguishes between preplanned targets and dynamic or

199. See William Henry Boothby, Autonomous Attack

Opportunity or Spectre?, in 16

YEARBOOK OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW 71, 81 (Terry D. Gill et al. eds., 2013) ("[T]hose

who decide that a sortie involving automated/autonomous attack technology shall be initiated
have, for these purposes, 'decided upon' the attacks that the weapon system undertakes in
accordance with the instructions that are fed into the mission control system at the
commencement of the sortie. Those decision-makers therefore have a responsibility to satisfy
themselves before the sortie commences that the scope of possible decisions that the weapon
system is being permitted to make properly reflects the Article 57(2)(a)(i) obligations.").
200. Constant, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/constant (last visited Nov. 11, 2017); Constant, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/constant (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (defining
"constant" as "happening all the time or very often over a period of time"); see also TALLINN
MANUAL, supra note 34, at 166 ("Use of the word 'constant' denotes that the duty to take care
to protect civilians and civilian objects is of a continuing nature throughout all cyber
operations.").
201. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 34, at 166; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber
Attacks: Proportionalityand Precautions in Attack, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 198, 202-03 (2013)
("[C]onstant care would likely require a commander to maintain situational awareness at all
times . . . [in order] to adjust operations if the tool or operation began to have effects that the
commander determined would have an illegal impact on civilians.").
202. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(a)(2)(i).
203. Sandoz et al., supra note 152, T 2189.
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emerging targets.204 Preplanned targets are "known to exist in the
operational environment." 205 They are typically static, as in the case of
buildings or military facilities. 206 Dynamic targets are those that emerge
during an armed conflict;

207

they are targets of opportunity. A tank that

suddenly emerges from a dense forest or a group of personnel engaging
friendly forces exemplifies dynamic targets. Autonomous weapons systems
could be used against dynamic or preplanned targets. Here, this Section will
focus on dynamic targets since they present the most challenging issues of
distinction, and one could argue that any system that is directed to engage a
particular target is, by definition, not autonomous.
In United States doctrine, targeting utilizes a six-step process: Find, Fix,
Track, Target, Engage, Assess.

208

First, intelligence collection identifies a

209

potential target.
The fix step of the process refers to actions taken to
confirm the nature and location of the target. 210 These first two steps can
occur simultaneously. 2 11 Once a target's location has been fixed, the target is
then tracked until engaged. 212 The targeting step refers to the allocation of
resources against the target, a risk assessment, deconfliction with other
friendly assets, and target validation. 213 During the validation, the operator
asks a series of questions designed to verify the validity of the target. 214 In
the final step of the process, an assessment is made as to whether the mission
215
was a success or failure.

204. See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JOINT
PUBLICATION 3-60, JoINT TARGETING 11-2 to 11-3 (2012) (noting U.S. doctrine categorizes
targets as either deliberate or dynamic, planned, or targets of opportunity) [hereinafter JoINT
PUBLICATION 3-60].

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 11-2.
See id
See id at 11-2.
Id at 11-23 fig.II-10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11-24.
See id. at 11-26 to 11-27.
See id. at 11-29.

214. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY TECHNICAL PUBLICATION 3-60,

¶

2-56 (May 7, 2015)

("Target validation asks such questions as: . . Is engaging the target lawful? . . Does the
target contribute to the enemy capability and will to wage war? Is the target (still) operational?
Is it (still) a viable element of a target system? . . Are there any facilities or targets on the nostrike list or restricted target list collocated with the target being validated? What is the relative
potential for collateral damage or collateral effects, to include casualties? . . . Would engaging
the target generate significant environmental impacts or arouse environmental sensitivities?").
215. See JoINT PUBLICATION 3-60, supra note 204, at 11-3 1.
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The obligation to comply with proportionality extends from the planning
of the attack through the execution of the attack. Article 57(2)(b) requires an
attack be:
cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is
not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated. 216
Thus, the requirement to cancel or suspend can be implicated by a
change in either the military advantage or the anticipated collateral damage.
This requirement applies to those who have the authority to cancel or
suspend, those at higher echelons of command who possess information that
would necessitate cancellation or suspension. 217
As discussed in the context of distinction and proportionality, autonomy
has the potential to allow the activation of a weapons system long before
targets are engaged. A prolonged engagement begs the question of when
precautions in attack should be taken: When the system is deployed, when it
is activated, when it is about to engage, or throughout the process?
Precautions in attack are continuous in nature and run from the activation of
the system to the engagement. 218 Technology has the potential to enhance
these requirements. Thus, if a cruise missile has a video feed and the ability
to abort, the operator would be obligated to monitor the feed and abort the
missile should the proportionality calculation change significantly.
Autonomy then raises the possibility that a system could be sophisticated
enough to take continual precautions in attack. If an AEW possessed such a

216. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(2)(b).
217. BOTHE ET AL., supra note 120, at 366 ("The Committee expressed the obligation in
the passive voice so that it would apply to all commanders who have the authority to cancel or
suspend attacks, including those at higher echelons who frequently have better intelligence
sources than those actually engaged. But it also applies to the commander in the military
organizations actually engaged in combat."); see OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 5.1.2
("[I]nternational obligations would only apply to those persons belonging to the party's forces
with the domestic authority to make the decisions necessary to implement those obligations.")
(citing United Kingdom, Statement on Ratification of AP I, Jan. 28, 1998, 2020 U.N.T.S. 75,
78 ("The United Kingdom understands that the obligation to comply with [art. 57] paragraph
2(b) only extends to those who have the authority and practical possibility to cancel or suspend
the attack.")).
218. See BoTHE ET AL., supra note 120, at 363.
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capability, a commander could rely on the system if he or she were confident
the system could conduct the precautions analysis with reasonable certainty.
In sum, the requirements for precautions in attack are continuing
obligations which affix to commanders and planners and all others who have
the requisite information and ability to cancel or suspend an attack if
necessary. Autonomy creates additional complexities in that the autonomous
weapon system itself may possess the capability to conduct the feasibility
analysis. There is nothing legally objectionable with this possibility,
assuming the system is of sufficient sophistication that the commander
employing the system is reasonably certain the system will comply with the
obligations to take feasible precautions in the attack.
F.

Control Over Weapons
1.

MeaningfulHuman Control

Weapons used in armed conflict should be controlled by their users. The
law of armed conflict is predicated on the idea of distinction, and thus
"method[s] or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective" are unlawful.219 Here "directed" is synonymous with
"controlled." 220 Similarly, the ability to cancel or suspend an attack and to
take feasible precautions in attack necessarily requires some degree of
control over the employment of the system. As a matter of practice,
militaries and commanders spend considerable time and money to maximize
control over their weapons systems. Indeed, control is arguably the very
essence of a military whether control of troops, units, weapons, or
munitions.
In the debate surrounding autonomous weapons, the concept of control
has manifested itself in the phrase "meaningful human control." 221
Meaningful human control holds, in short, that humans should exert some

219. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. II, art. 51(4)(b).
220. Directed, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us
/definition/american english/direct?q=directed#direct 19 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017)
("directed" means to "control the operations of').
221. See e.g., Horowitz & Scharre, supra note 10, at n.54; U.N. INST. FOR
DISARMAMENT RESEARCH, THE WEAPONIZATION OF INCREASINGLY AUTONOMOUS
TECHNOLOGIES: CONSIDERING HOW MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL MIGHT MOVE THE
DISCUSSION FORWARD (2014), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/considering-how-

meaningful-human-control-might-move-the-discussion-forward-en-615.pdf
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level of control over AEWs.222 While all acknowledge AEWs should be
controlled, there is considerable debate over the necessary level of control,
how that control is exerted, and upon what the control is exerted all
matters of meaningful discussion. 223 There further appears to be some
confusion about the requirement of control: Is it required by existing
international law or is it a policy imperative? This Section addresses the
issues of international law implicated by control-or lack thereof-of
weapons systems and attempts to provide some granularity to the discussion.
While the concept of meaningful human control has found currency
with some States, 224 the United States has instead adopted the phrase
"appropriate human judgment." 225 At the 2016 CCW Informal Meeting of
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Systems, the United States explained its
rationale behind this phrase.226 After noting its discomfort with the
subjectivity and lack of clear meaning, the United States stated:
We view the optimization of the human/machine relationship as a
primary technical challenge to developing lethal autonomous
weapon

systems .

. .

. Because

this human/machine

relationship

extends throughout the development and employment of a system
and is not limited to the moment of a decision to engage a target, we
consider it more useful to talk about "appropriate levels of human

judgment." 227
This formulation echoes a statement made by the United Kingdom at the
same meeting, where it expressed dissatisfaction with the phrase meaningful

222. The phrase was first introduced by Article 36, a British NGO. See ARTICLE 36,
WEAPONS (2013),
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/PolicyPaperl.pdf
223. See General Statement by Ger. at the 2015 U.N. Convention on Conventional
Weapons Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Apr. 13-17,
2014) (At the 2015 U.N. Convention on Conventional Weapons Informal Meeting of Experts
on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, the chair of the meeting, Germany, noted that the
2014 meeting produced "a common understanding regarding the necessity to exercise
appropriate levels of human control over the use of force.").
224. Countries making public statements on the concept include Croatia, Denmark,
Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, South Africa, South Korea, and Sweden.
225. DoD DIRECTIVE, supra note 26.
226. Michael W. Meier, Statement of the U.S. Delegation to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Systems (Apr. 11,
2016).
227. Id.

KILLER ROBOTS: UK GOVERNMENT POLICY ON FULLY AUTONOMOUS
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human control for the same reasons voiced by the United States. 228 As an
alternative, the United Kingdom proposed the concept of an "intelligent
partnership" between human and machine that holds that a fully autonomous
system is impractical if not impossible. 229 Instead, the United Kingdom
acknowledged that computers and humans have different strengths and
weaknesses, which necessitates a partnership between the two. 23 0
2.

Mechanisms of Control

The mechanism of control can be exercised through physical or
technological means. 231 Historically, weapons were controlled through
physical means. A human operator physically manipulates the weapon
through positioning and manual activation of the weapon system (e.g., a rifle
that is manually aimed and physically triggered by the user). Control
through technological means is control that is manifest in the software of a
system, such as an air-to-surface missile that, once launched, cannot be
controlled by the operator but has been programmed to target a particular
object. Control is exerted through the programming of the missile.
Control can be manifest across either or both vectors. By way of
example, a 120mm mortar is a weapons system that is entirely mechanical
and is controlled only by physical control. 23 2 A Paladin M109A6 155mm
artillery system, by contrast, is a highly automated artillery system
comprised of a 155mm artillery gun mounted on a tracked vehicle and
controlled by a sophisticated computer control system. 233 The Paladin is
controlled through a combination of physical control (e.g., where the
operator drives the vehicle) and technological control (computation of firing
data and automatic aiming of the gun tube). A cyber weapon, which has no
physical manifestation, would be entirely controlled by the technological
means, that is, through the programming of the weapon.
The relationship between physical and technological control is
particularly interesting in the context of highly automated technologies. As

228. Statement of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the Informal Meeting of Experts on
Lethal Autonomous Systems 6 (Apr. 11-15, 2016).
229. Id at 5-6.
230. Id. at 3.
231. See Sass6li, supra note 170, at 320 ("What counts is that either the system itself
through technical means, or the human beings using it, are able to acquire information
indicating that the attack must be interrupted .... .").
232. See generally U.S. ARMY ACQUISITION CORPS, WEAPON SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
284-85 (2016), https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/43 1298.pdf (providing a description of
Mortar Systems).
233. See generally id. at 72.
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weapons increase in technological sophistication, the requisite skill of the
operator also increases; increasingly complex weapons require increasingly
technologically savvy operators. At some point, however, the level of
technology and automation becomes sufficiently high that a sophisticated
operator may not be necessary. When computers were first introduced, they
were operated exclusively by highly knowledgeable users who physically
controlled the systems.234 As the sophistication of technology increased, the
requisite skill needed to operate the systems diminished and control was
increasingly manifest through technology (software) rather than physical
manipulation of punch cards and memory tapes. To be clear, control over the
system (computer or otherwise) does not diminish with increasing
sophistication, but rather, the nature of control (physical vice technological)
changes.
As a matter of law, there is no distinction between effecting control
through physical manipulation of a weapon (e.g., a wire-guided missile) and
effecting control through a computer program (e.g., a Tomahawk Cruise
Missile), so long as the requisite span of control can be expressed through
computer programming, and the program or system will operate with a
reasonable degree of certainty in a given environment. 235 The Phalanx
provides a useful illustration. A human operator programs certain parameters
into the system regarding when and what the system will engage. Based on
his or her knowledge of the system and the environment in which it is
operating, the human operator can be reasonably certain the weapon will
function in a particular manner. When an object-an enemy missile for
instance triggers the Phalanx engagement criteria, the system will
automatically engage the missile. What and when the system engages is
entirely controlled by the human operator, albeit through a pre-programmed
set of instructions.

234. See Invention of the PC, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/inventions/
invention-of-the-pc (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) ("The earliest electronic computers
were . . enormous and hugely expensive, and they required a team of engineers and other
specialists to keep them running.").
235. See WILLIAM BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 233
(2009) (noting that precautionary requirements can be met by having a person "in the loop" or
by advance programming which controls "the timing, location, objective, and means
of . . attack").
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Control Predicates

As discussed below, control of a weapon is manifest across three
dimensions: time, space, and effects. 23 6 All weapons systems, conventional
or autonomous, are controlled through these dimensions. 23 7 A dumb bomb
dropped from an aircraft is controlled by time (when it is dropped), space
(where it is dropped), and weapons effects (what size bomb is dropped). The
ability to exert control over each dimension, however, is contingent on two
predicates: the skill of the operator and an effective interface that allows the
user to effect control over the system. An AEW cannot be controlled unless
these two predicates are first met. This Section discusses first these
predicates of control (skill and effective interface) and then the dimensions
of control (time, space, and effects).
a.

OperatorSkill as a ControlPredicate

The first predicate requires that the AEW operator possess the skill to
operate the system. There is a direct relationship between the skill of the
operator and the ability to control a weapon. A RAND Corporation study on
the effect of personnel quality on the performance of the Patriot Air-Defense
System provides a useful illustration. The RAND report found "considerable
evidence that [standardized test scores have] a direct and consistent effect on
the outcomes of air battles . . . ."238 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the study
concluded that "soldiers with higher [standardized test scores] can be
expected to suffer significantly less asset damage, destroy more hostile
aircraft, and be more effective in missile conservation." 23 9 Needless to say,
an air-defense system operator who is more efficient with regards to missile
conservation and enemy aircraft identification is less likely to engage a
civilian aircraft.
Operator skill includes the skills necessary to operate the AEW,
including activation, initiation, execution, maintenance, deactivation, and a
basic understanding of the operational characteristics of the AEW, including
its operational characteristics (e.g., how far it can fire, what munitions it

236. See id.
237. This is not a novel argument. See, e.g., Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous
Weapons Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal DecisionMaking, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 687, 695 (2012).
238. BRUCE R. ORVIS ET AL., RAND ARROYO CENTER, EFFECT OF PERSONNEL
QUALITY ON THE PERFORMANCE OF PATRIOT AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM OPERATORS vi (1992),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R390 1.pdf
239. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

43

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
456

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6 9: 413

fires, etc.) as well as its operational reliability (e.g., what level of
predictability does the system exhibit, how accurate is the system, etc.). An
operator with a greater degree of skill will have a better ability to exert
control vice an operator with a low degree of skill. For example, if a person
with no military experience were to attempt to operate a 120mm mortar, the
person would have effectively no control over the system, whereas a skilled
operator would have the ability to control the mortar.
b.

Effective Interface as a ControlPredicate

The second control predicate requires an operator/system interaction
such that the operator can exert control over the function of the AEW. In
other words, an operator must have both the necessary skill and system
understanding, but also an ability to actually effect control. If the AEW is
out of communication, broken, or physically too distant, the human user
cannot exert control. Not only must the AEW be capable of being controlled,
the means to effect control includes a readily understood user interface.
In the 2016 Summer Study on Autonomy, the U.S. Defense Science
Board discussed the issue of user interface at some length.2 40 The report
grounds the discussion of control in the concept of trust, such that the
machine will do what the user expects and intends the machine to do. 241 As
the report concludes, "[e]stablishing trustworthiness ... and providing
adequate indicator capabilities so that inevitable context-based variations in
operational trustworthiness can be assessed and dealt with at run-time is
essential, not only for the operator and the Commander, but also for
designers, testers, policy and lawmakers, and the American public." 242 The
report lists several "barriers to trust" including "ineffective interfaces." 243
When considering control over technologically sophisticated weapons
systems, a corollary to an effective user interface is the requirement of
mutual understanding between human operator and machine. An AEW "may
have different sensors and data sources than any of its human teammates,"
and thus "may be operating on different contextual assumptions of the
operational environment." 244 Similarly, machines and human operators need
to have a shared understanding of the goals the operator wishes to achieve.
By way of example, the Summer Study notes many of the aviation accidents
of the 1990s where "the flight crew had one goal (e.g., staying on the glide

240. DEF. SCIENCE BD., supra note 73.

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 14.
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slope during an approach) and the flight management computer had another
(e.g., executing a go-around)."

4.

245

Control Through Effects, Space, and Time

Assuming the operator satisfies both predicates (skill and effective
interface), he or she can exert control across three dimensions. First, control
may be asserted through the effects of weapon selection: A targeting officer
selects a 500-pound dumb bomb for a given mission, rather than a 1,000pound dumb bomb. Thus, before the munition has left the aircraft, the
operator has taken actions to control the weapon.246 In an advanced weapon
system with autonomous features, the process would be the same. The type
of weapon selected for the engagement and the features activated would be
determined based on the nature of the target.
The second vector of control is spatial control. Conventionally, this is
expressed by where the user points the weapon. For example, an artillery
round is geographically controlled by where the operator aims the gun tube.
Most conventional weapons are activated and employed in the same
geographic locale, which provides the user with an understanding of where
and how the weapon is affecting the battlefield.
AEWs differ in that they might be activated in one geographic area, but
their effects manifest elsewhere. That is not to say they cannot be controlled;
it is just that the nature of the control changes. To use a conventional
example, consider a cruise missile that travels hundreds of miles. Here, the
spatial control is perhaps less apparent but is no less considerable. Spatial
control is exerted by programming the location of where the missile will
strike. Thus, a cruise missile fired 1,000 miles from the target may be more
accurate than an artillery round fired ten miles from the target. The same
control could be exerted over an AEW where its operation could be easily
geographically bounded.
The third dimension of control is time. Temporal restrictions on AEWs
could restrict operations during a specified period, or prohibit operations for
a given period. An artillery round, for example, is controlled in time by
choice of the operator when to engage the system. AEWs change this aspect

245. Id. at 15.
246. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET NO. 14-210, USAF
INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE 56 (1998). This process is commonly referred to as
weaponeering, which is defined as "the process of estimating the quantity of a specific type
weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target
vulnerability, weapon effects, munition delivery errors, damage criteria, probability of kill,
weapon reliability, etc." Id.
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of control in that they have the ability to operate for extended periods of
time, turn on and off in a given period, or both. Depending on the nature of
the system, this could result in increased or decreased temporal control. An
AEW deployed for an extended period is unconstrained from a temporal
perspective. Conversely, that same system could be programmed to only
operate in short periods of predetermined time, which would enable a high
degree of temporal control.
IV. WEAPON REVIEWS

A.

Generally

Before a commander uses any weapon in combat, he or she will (or
should) demand assurances that the weapon will act in accordance with the
specifications provided and in a lawful manner. The weapons review process
generates this information. 247 The legal lodestar for this obligation is Article
35 of Additional Protocol I, which reaffirms the longstanding proposition
that the methods and means of warfare are not unlimited. 248 The weapons
review process ensures weapons are not unlawful. 249 For States party,
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I operationalizes the weapons review
requirement, which imposes an obligation to review new weapons. 250 The
mechanism for this obligation is the weapons review process. 25 1 While the
Additional Protocol does not mandate the form of the weapons review, it is
widely accepted that a review should consider both the weapon itself and the
252
planned and normal circumstances of the weapon's use.
International humanitarian law prohibits two broad categories of
weapons as unlawful per se: those that cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering; 253 and those that are inherently indiscriminate,
including weapons that cannot be aimed or whose effects cannot be

247. Sandoz et al., supra note 152, T 1469.
248. AP I, supra note 77, pt. III, § 1, art. 35.
249. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78,

¶

6.2.2.

250. AP I, supra note 77, pt. III, § 1, art. 36.
251. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, ¶ 6.2.2.
252. Sandoz et al., supra note 152, ¶ 1469; OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, ¶ 6.2.2
(the U.S. considers the "weapon's intended use" to determine whether the weapon is
"calculated to cause superfluous injury"); see also ICRC WEAPONS GUIDE, supra note 34, at
938 ("A weapon or means of warfare cannot be assessed in isolation from the method of
warfare by which it is to be used. It follows that the legality of a weapon does not depend
solely on its design or intended purpose, but also on the manner in which it is expected to be
used on the battlefield.").

253. AP I, supra note 77, pt. III, § 1, art. 35.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/5

46

Ford: Autonomous Weapons and International Law
2017]

AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS

459

controlled.2 54 Both categories of prohibitions reflect customary international
law. 255 There is nothing inherent in an autonomous weapons system that
raises unique issues in this regard, as the technology of autonomy does not,
in and of itself, create superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. In the
same way, the technology of autonomy does not create indistinction.
Weapons reviews should, of course, consider these per se prohibitions,
though they are unlikely to be violated by the autonomous aspect of the
weapon. Determining the lawfulness of an autonomous weapons system in
its normal and expected circumstances of use is more challenging.
B.

Challenges with Testing Advanced Technology

While not unique to autonomous weapons, the implicit technological
sophistication of autonomous systems demands increasingly sophisticated
means of testing the systems. Addressing the issue of testing technologically
complex weapons, Alan Backstrom and Ian Henderson write, "[t]he use of a
guided weapon with an autonomous firing option requires an understanding
of the legal parameters; the engineering design, production, and testing (or
validation) methods; and the way in which the weapon might be employed
on the battlefield." 256 More than that, advancing technologies will require
new approaches to test technologically sophisticated weapons.
The software that animates AEWs presents a particularly challenging
area for testing. Many AEWs will rely on machine learning algorithms,
which enable the system to "iteratively learn from data," so that the system
will "produce reliable, repeatable decisions and results." 257 There are several
methods used to train machine learning algorithms, including supervised and
unsupervised learning models. 258 The most common learning method,
supervised learning, requires that the learning algorithm be fed training data
to learn what the user desires the machine to learn. Thus, an algorithm

254. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. 2, art. 51(4)(b)-(c).
255. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 84, at 237, 244-45; see generally
BOOTHBY, supra note 235, at 46-73 (discussing the historical development of prohibition on
weapons that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering).
256. Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of
Contemporary Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and EngineeringIssues
in Article 36 Weapons Reviews, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 483, 484 (2012).
257. Machine Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com/
en us/insights/analytics/machine-learning.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
258. Jason Brownlee, A Tour of Machine Learning Algorithms, MACHINE LEARNING
MASTERY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://machinelearningmastery.com/a-tour-of-machine-learningalgorithms/.
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designed to identify enemy tanks would be provided millions of images of
tanks and the system would self-adjust as it became more accurate.
In the context of AEWs, there are two broad concerns with machine
learning. First, a machine-learning algorithm is only as good as the training
it receives. A supervised learning process for an AEW designed to identify
and destroy enemy tanks might include feeding the algorithm images labeled
as tanks, and then later asking it to identify a tank among a group of vehicle
images. Corrupt data will lead to corrupt results. Thus, if the algorithm is
provided pictures of a truck and told that it is a tank, the algorithm will have
an impaired ability to identify tanks (and trucks). The second problem
occurs when the training data does not fully replicate the environment in
which the system is designed to operate. If then, an algorithm is trained to
identify tanks by being provided images of tanks taken in a wooded
environment, the algorithm may come to define a tank as a tank-like object
plus a wooded environment. In a desert or mountainous environment, the
algorithm might be unable to identify a tank. Where, as in these examples,
the algorithm cannot identify its target, it is not malfunctioning; rather, the
problem is with the training.
C.

Scope of Testing

The importance of testing weapons in the circumstances of their
expected use exists too with regards to conventional weapons, but the
importance is particularly acute when considering autonomous weapons and
other highly sophisticated weapons. A bullet, for instance, will perform the
same in the daytime as in the nighttime. Where a weapon relies on a suite of
sophisticated sensors, however, weather and time of day are critical. By way
of example, consider the Israeli HARPY system. The HARPY is an
unmanned aircraft that loiters above a battlefield until it detects enemy radar,
wherein it will engage the target in a kamikaze-style attack. 25 9 Say,
hypothetically, that during testing it was determined the HARPY could
distinguish the military objective from civilian objects 98% of the time in
dry, sunny weather. This conclusion is relevant to the use of the HARPY in
dry, sunny weather, but it is irreverent with regards to other circumstances of
use (e.g., at night, in the rain, in the fog, etc.).
The parallels to an armed conflict scenario utilizing autonomous
weapons systems are evident. Systems may be trained with incorrect data or
data that is unconsciously biased. Weapons testing will only identify such

259. Harpy Air Defense Suppression System, DEFENSE UPDATE INT'L ONLNE DEFENSE
MAGAZINE, http://defense-update.com/directory/harpy.htm#cont (last updated Mar. 4, 2006).
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issues where the training environment accurately reflects the context in
which the system will be used. In all reviews, certain best practices should
be considered. These include the following:
*

The weapons review should either be a multi-disciplinary process or
include attorneys who have the technical expertise to understand the
nature and results of the testing process.

*

The review should delineate the circumstances of use for which the
weapon was approved.

*

The review should provide a clear delineation of human and system
responsibilities. Who will do what in a given circumstance?

*

Optimally, the review should occur at three points in time. First, when
the proposal is made to transition a weapon from research to
development. Second, before the weapon is fielded. 260 Finally, AEWs
should be re-reviewed periodically based upon feedback on how the
weapon is functioning. This suggestion would necessitate the
establishment of a clear feedback loop that provides information from
the developer to the reviewer to the user, and back again. This
suggestion is perhaps not unique to AEWs, but it is of particular
importance given the adaptability of autonomous weapons systems.

The review should also address the learning capacity of the AEW are
all sister systems trained exactly the same? Does it learn in situ in the
operational environment?
In short, there are certainly aspects of weapons reviews in the context of
autonomous weapons that need to be carefully considered. A robust weapons
review is fundamental to ensuring autonomous weapons systems are used
consistent with international humanitarian law.
V.

ACCOUNTABILITY

If AEWs are used in armed conflict, there exists the possibility that they
might be involved in a violation of the law of armed conflict. This prospect
raises unique issues regarding the allocation of responsibility for the
violation. Can a commander be held accountable for the actions of an AEW?
Can the developer of the AEW be held accountable? Can the AEW itself be

260. This two-step review is the process adopted by the U.S. Department of Defense
Directive on autonomous weapons. DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 26, at 7.
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held accountable? These are truly challenging issues of law, which have
generated significant scholarship and necessitate careful consideration
before the deployment of autonomous systems. This Part considers the
requirement and mechanisms for accountability under international law.
Here, consideration is given to both criminal and civil liability from the
perspective of the individual, the commander, and the State.
A.

Requirement to Hold Accountable

Treaty 26 1 and customary international law 262 obligate States to hold
263
accountable those that seriously violate the law of armed conflict.

Accountability under international law includes individual responsibility in
the form of direct 264 and command responsibility, 265 as well as State

261. GC I, supra note 91, art. 49; GC II, supra note 91, art. 50; GC III, supra note 91,
art. 129; GC IV, supra note 91, art. 146; AP I, supra note 77, art. 86 (requires States party to
"repress grave breaches, and take measures to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions
or of this Protocol . . . ."); see also Rome Statute, supra note 97, pmbl.; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. VI, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural

Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, art. 28, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212;
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their

Destruction, art. VII(1), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45; Amended Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, art. 14, May 3, 1996,
2048 U.N.T.S. 93; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, art. 9, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056

U.N.T.S. 211.
262. Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 7(1), Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 112; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide, art. VI, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; GC I, supra note 91, art. 49; GC II, supra
note 91, art. 50; GC III, supra note 91, art. 129; GC IV, supra note 91, art. 146.
263. OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 18.3.1 ("Each member of the armed forces
has a duty to comply with the law of war in good faith.").
264. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 65 (3rd ed. 2013) ("War crimes are serious violations of customary or treaty rules
belonging to international humanitarian law. .. .") [hereinafter CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW]; DINSTEIN, supra note 151, at 263 (citing DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM-27-10:
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY: FIELD MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ch. 8 (1956),
http://www.aschq.army.mil/gc/files/FM27-10.pdf ("In the past, it was frequently contended
that '[e]very violation of the law of war is a war crime.' But such assertions have never elicited
support in actual State practice.")).
265. Rome Statute, supra note 97, pmbl.
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responsibility.2 66 International Human Rights Law also, arguably, contains
requirements for accountability. 267
B.

CriminalLiability
1.

ThresholdIssues

Individual criminal responsibility for a violation of the law of armed
conflict necessitates the existence of an armed conflict. 268 This seemingly

perfunctory threshold raises significant problems in the context of
developers of autonomous weapons. As Tim McCormack and Tim
McFarland point out, autonomous weapon development will often occur
before the armed conflict commences. 269 This fact generates novel issues of
accountability. How does one hold accountable, for example, an engineer
who in peacetime develops an AEW that is designed to commit war crimes,
and does, in fact, do so during a later armed conflict? McCormack and
McFarland were "unable to identify any extant jurisprudence from
international war crimes trials to support the notion of individual criminal

266. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 28; AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art.
86(1), 87(1); OFF. OF GEN. COUNS., supra note 78, T 18.4 ("Military commanders have a duty
to take appropriate measures as are within their power to control the forces under their
command for the prevention of violations of the law of war.").

267. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(3), Dec. 1966, 99
U.N.T.S. 171 (requiring each State Party to ensure that "any person whose rights or
freedom . .
are violated shall have an effective remedy .... ); Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14,
art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 ("Everyone whose rights and freedoms . . are
violated shall have an effective remedy .... ) (amended June 1, 2010); Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law,
U.N. Doc A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) (stating that States have a duty to "[t]ake appropriate
legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to prevent violations . . . [and]
where appropriate, take action against those allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic
and international law").
268. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 67 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2
1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm; compare Rome Statute, supra
note 97, art. 8 (defining war crimes), with Definition of War Crimes, U.N. OFFICE ON
GENOCIDE PREVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.un.org/en/
genocideprevention/war-crimes.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (stating the requirement that
the alleged "conduct took place in the context of and was associated with . .
armed conflict").
269. Tim McFarland & Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of
Autonomous Weapons Systems be Liable for War Crimes?, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 361, 374 (2014).
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liability for war crimes where an accused's acts have occurred prior to the
commencement of an armed conflict."

270

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's
(ICTY) jurisprudence also calls into question the ability to prosecute a
person for a war crime where the conduct occurs before the armed
conflict. 27' In Tadit, the tribunal concluded "each of the four Geneva

Conventions contains language intimating that their application may extend
beyond the cessation of fighting." 272 The tribunal provides no consideration
to the idea that the conventions may extend before the armed conflict.
Indeed, Tadit is particularly notable for its studied consideration of when an
armed conflict commences, and by extension, when criminal liability
attaches. 273

2.

Direct Individual CriminalResponsibility

Direct physical perpetration refers to "physically and personally
perpetrating a crime or engendering a culpable omission in violation of a
rule of criminal law." 274 While addressing Article 3 of the ICTY Charter, the
appeals chamber in Tadit articulated a cumulative four-part test for war
crimes that has found broad support. 275 To constitute a war crime, the
tribunal found the following elements must all be satisfied:
i.

the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of
international humanitarian law;

270. Id. at 377.
271. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 67 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2
1995).
272. Id
273. Id ¶¶ 67, 70; see Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, T 40,
51, 135 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf.
274. See Prosecutor v. Naletid, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶ 62 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic
martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf (defining "committing" with the same language);
Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 187-88 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/
tad-aj990715e.pdf (using similar language to describe conduct creating liability).
275. See Robert Cryer, Individual Liability in International Law, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 538, 541 (Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack

eds., 2016) ("The current, most influential, statement of the conditions for a violation of IHL
to be considered a war crime was given by the ICTY in its seminal Tadit decision.").
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ii.

the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty
law, the required conditions must be met .. .;

iii.

the violation must be "serious", that is to say, it must constitute
a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach
must involve grave consequences for the victim .. .;

iv.

the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the

465

person breaching the rule. 276

A full examination of the elements of this test is beyond the scope of
this Article. Consider instead the last element of the test that requires
"individual criminal responsibility." This element encompasses both
objective (actus rea) and subjective (mens rea) elements. The actus rea for a
war crime is the same regardless of whether the crime is committed by an
autonomous weapons system or a human.
In the context of individual criminal responsibility, mere negligence is
insufficient to satisfy the mens rea.277 Absent intent, criminal liability will
attach only when an individual's negligence "reaches the threshold of gross
or culpable negligence." 278 Antonio Cassese describes this mental state as
evidenced by "conduct that is blatantly at odds with the prescribed
standards." 279 Conduct that "falls short of the standard of precautions"
would constitute simple negligence, and thus not satisfy the mens rea
requirement. 28 0 It is also worth noting that the Rome Statute appears to
impose a higher culpability to certain crimes such as "willful killing," 281
"intentionally directing attacks against" civilians, 28 2 and other crimes.283

276. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2
1995).
277. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 413
(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2009).
278. CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 264, at 53.
279. Id at 52.
280. Id at 52-53.
281. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 8(2)(a)(1).
282. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(e)(i).
283. DINSTEIN, supra note 151, at 279 ("Article 8(2)(b)(xi) of the Rome Statute sets a
higher standard of intent by insisting that killing or wounding will be perpetrated
'treacherously."'). But see Johan D. Van der Vyver, The InternationalCriminal Court and the
Concept of Mens Rea in InternationalCriminalLaw, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 57,
71, 111-12 (2005) (citing Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 370, 389 (Antonio Cassese, et al. eds.,
2002)) (rejecting the assertion made by Michael Bothe and others that the modifiers such as
"willful," "treacherously," and "intentionally" convert these crimes to special intent crimes).
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In the conventional sense, direct individual criminal responsibility is the
soldier who willfully kills a civilian. Whether the soldier does so with his or
her hands or rifle, the soldier directly perpetrates the crime. Article 25(3)(a)
of the Rome Statute sets forth various modes of principal liability for the
International Criminal Court, including direct perpetration where a person
commits a crime as an individual.284 Article 7 of the ICTY Statute contains
similar language to Article 25, which establishes individual criminal
responsibility for "[a] person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a
crime .... ."285
Where, however, a machine with some degree of autonomy commits the
willful killing, one may fairly question whether the operator who activated
the system but does not control it has directly perpetrated the crime.
Making this determination requires an examination of the elements of the
substantive crime, including the actus reus and mens rea. If for example, an
autonomous machine attacks a civilian during armed conflict, the question
arises as to who would be liable for the war crime of "willful killing." The
actus reus of the crime requires that the "perpetrator killed one or more
persons."

28 6

The

Rome

Statute

explains

"[t]he

term

'killed'

is

interchangeable with the term 'caused death."' 28 7 The degree of autonomy
exhibited by the autonomous weapons system would dictate whether the
person activating the system could be said to have caused the death of the
victim.
Where there is a low level of autonomy, the causal link between the
death and activation is evident. For example, an operator activates a surface
to air missile that destroys an unequivocally civilian aircraft ten seconds
later. It can be said that the operator caused the deaths of the civilians on the
plane. Demonstrating a causal link for a more autonomous system could
prove challenging. Consider a hypothetical AEW designed to target enemy
aircraft. If the system is activated in January and engages a civilian aircraft
in April, did the person who activated the system in January cause the
civilian deaths in April? If the AEW was programmed to shoot down the
first civilian airliner it encounters, then yes. If the AEW selected the civilian

284. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 25(3)(a).
285. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
art. 7(1) (2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal 0%`20Library/Statute/statute sept09_en.pdf
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
286. Elements of Crimes, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/res
ourcelibrary/official-journal/elements-of-crimes.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
287. Id. at 13 n.31 (explaining in the explanatory note that the structure of the elements
mirrors the structure of the corresponding articles in the Rome Statute).
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airliner from among many targets, then it becomes a question of the
programming of the system. Did the system have the ability to distinguish
between military and civilian? If so, how accurate was the software? Did the
commander understand the system's limitations? Was the system tested in
the same environment in which it was utilized?
Assuming the actus reus element can be satisfied, the mens rea of this
crime requires that the perpetrator was aware of the victim's protected
status. The perpetrator in this example is arguably the AEW, which has no
awareness of the victim's status. The perpetrator could also be the
commander who ordered the AEW activated. Again, however, with
sufficient levels of autonomy, the commander who ordered the system will
be unaware of any specific victims until after the engagement, let alone their
status. In order to satisfy the mens rea requirement for direct responsibility,
the commander would have to be acting with culpable negligence; that is to
say, the commander acted "blatantly at odds with the prescribed
standards."2 88 This highlights the importance of weapons testing. Knowing
the results of the testing process helps inform the question as to whether the
commander's decision was reasonable.
3.

Co-PerpetratorCriminalResponsibility

Two additional modes of liability are co-perpetration, where a person
commits a crime "jointly with another," 28 9 and indirect perpetration, where a
person commits a crime "through another person." 290 In a series of recent
decisions, the ICC has also applied a doctrine of indirect co-perpetration. 291

288. CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 264, at 52.
289. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 25(3)(a).
290. Id.
291. Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)-(b) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 298 (Jan. 23,
2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_01006.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017);
Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 210 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/
CR2007_02360.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (citing Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 326-28 (Jan. 29, 2007));
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01-07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶¶ 533-34 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.P
DF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). But see Prosecutorv. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424,
Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)-(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor
against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 345 (June 15, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Court
Records/CR2009_04528.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (stating analysis of indirect coparticipation is not applicable since the Prosecutor put forth precisely the elements of coparticipation).
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Article 25(3)(b) further contemplates several accessorial modes of liability
where one commits a crime when one "[o]rders, solicits, or induces the
commission" of a crime within the jurisdiction of the court.2 92 Finally,
Article 25(3)(c) criminalizes the facilitation of a crime, including those acts
which aid, abet, or assist the commission of the crime.293
The ICTY has developed its own variant of co-perpetrator liability
known as Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE). 294 While not expressly mentioned
in Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, the ICTY has found that the article "does
not exclude those modes of participating in the commission of crimes which
occur where several persons having a common purpose embark on criminal
activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some members of this
plurality of persons." 295 The ICTY has actually developed three variants of
JCE, the details of which are not relevant to the instant discussion.296 For all
three variants, the mens rea element requires that "those who take part in a
common criminal act are aware of its purpose and share its requisite criminal
intent ... . "297 Thus, JCE would be an inapplicable mode of liability for the
development and use of autonomous weapons unless the design and use
were intended "to perpetrate a certain crime" or "further the criminal activity
or the criminal purpose of a group . . . ."298
Co-perpetration is the "division of essential tasks for the purpose of
committing a crime between two or more persons acting in a concerted
manner." 299 Co-perpetration necessitates a plan with "an element of
criminality . . . ." 300 The court further clarified that this would encompass
co-perpetrators that "(a) are aware of the risk that implementing the common
plan (which is specifically directed at the achievement of a non-criminal
goal) will result in the commission of the crime, and (b) accept such an

292. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 25(3)(b).
293. Id. art. 25(3)(c).
294. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 368 (2d ed. 2010).
295. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, T 189-90 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad
-aj990715e.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
296. See generally CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 264, at 163-72
(describing the three variants of JCE).
297. Id. at 263; see also Tadit, IT-94-1-A T 228 (describing the three mens rea
elements).
298. Tadit, IT-94-1-A T 228.
299. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on Confirmation
of Charges, ¶ 342 (Jan. 29, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_02360.PDF
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
300. Id. ¶ 344.
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outcome." 3 ' Even setting aside the unlikely scenario where an autonomous
weapons system is specifically developed to commit war crimes, this mode
of liability could still be of relevance to those deploying autonomous
systems. For example, military planners and commanders may coordinate to
employ an AEW despite the fact that for the given circumstance or
environment, it cannot distinguish between civilians and combatants with
reasonable certainty. If commanders and planners know this, arguably they
could be considered co-perpetrators (with one another) if the autonomous
system commits a war crime.
Indirect co-perpetration is a hybrid mode of liability that combines an
indirect perpetrator (e.g., an individual who exercises control over the person
who commits the crime) with a co-perpetrator (e.g., an individual who
exercises control over the person who sets up a common plan to commit a
crime).302 This mode of liability concerns a circumstance in which leaders
act together to commit criminal acts, with each leader using an organization
under their control.3 03 Indirect co-perpetration allows for the attribution of
the crimes to all leaders involved in the plan, regardless of whether the
leader had control over all the subordinate forces committing the war
crimes.3 04 This mode of liability is likely inapplicable to the context of
autonomous weapons.
Aiding and abetting is a mode of liability found in the Rome Statute,3 05
as well as the Statutes of the ICTY,3 06 the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR),3 07 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL). 308
Aiding and abetting contemplates those acts "specifically directed to assist,

301. Id.
302. CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 265, at 178-79; see Prosecutor v. Al
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01-09-3, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, T
213 (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514.PDF (last visited
Nov. 11, 2017); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01-07-717, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, TT 490, 492-94 (Sept. 30, 2008), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2008_05172.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). But see Prosecutor v. Gombo,
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)-(b) of the Rome Statute
on the Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, T 351 (June 15, 2009),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_04528.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017)
(describing the elements for liability as a co-perpetrator).
303. CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 264, at 178-79.
304. Id.
305. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 25(3)(c).
306. ICTY Statute, supra note 285, art. 7(1).
307. Statute of the Tribunal of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(1)
(1994),
http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 11, 2017) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
308. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(1) (2002), http://www.rscsl.org/
Documents/scsl-statute.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
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encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific
crime .... ."309 "[A]iding and abetting includes all acts of assistance by
words or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as the requisite
intent is present." 310 Much like JCE, the intent, or mens rea, of aiding and
abetting entails "knowledge that assistance aids the commission of criminal
acts, along with awareness of the essential elements of these crimes." 3 11
Thus, unless the developer or commander employing the autonomous
system had knowledge that the system could commit criminal acts, they
cannot be said to have aided or abetted the crimes, or both.
4.

Command Responsibility312

Command responsibility "provides for a mode of liability, through
which superiors may be held criminally responsible for crimes within the
"1313
jurisdiction of the Court committed by his or her subordinates ....
3 14
Command responsibility is sui generis; the superior is not being held

309. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tadaj990715e.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
310. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment by Judges Stephen
& Vohrah, ¶ 689 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
311. Prosecutor v. Perigid, Case No. IT-04-8 1-A, Judgment, ¶ 48 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013) (citing Prosecutor v. Mrkiid, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A,
Appeals Judgment, ¶ 159 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 5, 2009)),
http://www.icty.org/case/mrksic/4 (last visited Nov. 11, 2017); Prosecutor v. Blaikid, Case No.
IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29,
2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228_judgement.pdf (last visited Nov.
11,2017).
312. The terms "command responsibility" and "superior responsibility" will be used
interchangeably for the purposes of this Article. For a thorough discussion on command
responsibility in the context of autonomous weapons, see Peter Margulies, Making
Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility for Computer-Guided Lethal
Force in Armed Conflicts, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REMOTE WARFARE (Jens David

Ohlin ed., 2017).
313. Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment Pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, T 171 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/C
R2009_04528.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (citing Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)-(b) of the Rome Statute on the
Charges of the Prosecutor against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 341 (June 15, 2009)),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02238.PDF (last visited Nov. 11, 2017)).
314. Id. ¶ 174.
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responsible for the acts of the subordinate, 315 but rather the superior's own
acts or omissions. 3 16 Command responsibility is not a form of strict
liability. 317
The Statutes of the ICTY, 3 18 the ICTR, 319 and the corresponding

jurisprudence, 320 reflect customary law. The most comprehensive discussion
of the issue came in the 6elebidi case, 321 which articulated the requirements
under customary law and ICTY/ICTR statute:
(1) The superior must exercise direct and/or indirect command or
control whether de jure and/or de facto, over the subordinates who
commit serious violations of international humanitarian law, and/or
their superiors.
(2) The superior must know or have reason to know, which includes
ignorance resulting from the superior's failure to properly supervise
his subordinates, that these acts were about to be committed, or had
been committed, even before he assumed command and control.
(3) The superior must fail to take the reasonable and necessary
measures, that are within his power, or at his disposal in the
circumstances, to prevent or punish these subordinates for these
offences.

322

As with direct responsibility, mens rea must be established to hold a
person accountable under the theory. 323 The second prong of the Celebidi

for

315. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, T 171 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
the Former Yugoslavia Sept.
17, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/

acjug/en/krn-aj030917e.pdf (last visited on Nov. 11, 2017).
316. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
the Former Yugoslavia Nov.

16 1998),

¶ 333

(Int'l Crim. Trib. for

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116

judgen.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).

317. Id ¶ 383 ("The doctrine of superior responsibility does not establish a standard of
strict liability for superiors for failing to prevent or punish the crimes committed by their
subordinates.").
318. ICTY Statute, supra note 285.

319. Id.
320. Prosecutor v. Blagkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj0

40729e.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
321. See Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
for

the

Former Yugoslavia

Nov.

16

1998),

¶ 333

(Int'l Crim. Trib.

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/

981116_judgen.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
322. Id. ¶ 344.
323. Id. T 327.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

59

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 5
472

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6 9: 413

test articulates the mens rea requirement for command responsibility. 324
Thus, commanders can be held liable under the doctrine where they have
actual knowledge of the unlawful acts, or had reason to know of the
unlawful acts. As Antonio Cassese has written, "knowledge is required in
most cases of command responsibility." 325 In cases where actual knowledge
does not exist, gross negligence is sufficient to establish the mens rea.326
The clearest expression of this is the "should have known" standard found in
the Additional Protocol, 327 Rome Statute, 328 and the ad hoc tribunals. 329
Article 28 of the Rome Statute deviates from customary international
law in two regards. In the first, the Rome Statute establishes different mens
rea standards for military vice civilian superiors.330 Military commanders
are liable where they "either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the
time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to
commit such crimes," 331 whereas the mens rea for civilian superiors is the
more relaxed standard that they "either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing
or about to commit" crimes.

332

Secondly, the Rome Statute adds the

requirement of causation, that is, a requirement that the subordinate's crimes
occurred "as a result of ... [the superior's] failure to exercise control." 333
Unsurprisingly, all formulations of the doctrine of command
responsibility envision "subordinates" committing the underlying crime. 334
In common parlance, the term subordinate connotes a person. 335 The
dictionary definition, however, supposes a broader definition. The Oxford

324. Id.
325. CASSESE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 264, at 51.

326. See id. at 53.
327. See, e.g., AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV,

§ 1,

ch. IV, art. 86(2) ("The fact that a breach

of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his
superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility . . . if they knew, or had information which
should have enabled them to conclude . . that he was committing or was going to commit
such a breach . . . .").
328. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 28(a)(i) ("That military commander or person
either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were
committing or about to commit such crimes.").

329. Delalit, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 344; Prosecutor v. Halilovid, Case No. IT-01-48-T,
Judgment, ¶ 67 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2005).
330. Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 28.

331. Id. art. 28(a)(i).
332. Id. art. 28(b)(i).
333. Id. art. 28(a); see also Cryer, supra note 275, at 396-97.
334. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 28(b).
335. See Subordinate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster
.com/dictionary/subordinate (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (noting that "subordinate" can mean
"[i]nferior: a subordinate officer").
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English Dictionary defines subordinate as "dependent upon, subservient
to . . . something which is subordinate; a subordinate thing . . . ."336 Case law
from the ad hoc tribunals seems to support the idea that command
responsibility can exist over a "thing" such as a military unit, rather than a
specific subordinate person. 337 Citing ICTY decisions, Gu6nael Mettraux
writes:
The prosecution would not necessarily be required to identify [the
subordinates] by name, if it can be established, as a minimum, that
the perpetrators were part of a unit, organ or structure over which
the accused had authority and that the accused was able to exercise
effective control over the members of that body or group, including
338
those who committed the crimes.

When then does the commander exercise "direct and/or indirect
command or control" over an autonomous system? Culpability under the
doctrine of superior responsibility requires that the superior must have had
"effective control" over those subordinates who have committed the
underlying crime.339 Effective control, in turn, has been interpreted to mean
the commander can "prevent [subordinates] from committing crimes or
punish them after they committed the crimes." 340 As Mettraux has written,
"[i]t is a relationship of authority which goes almost unquestioned between
its two poles: one side orders; the other obeys." 34 1 Sufficient levels of
autonomy strain this "unquestioned" relationship. At some point along the
spectrum of autonomy, there exists the possibility that the system may not
obey. Deploying such a system raises issues of individual responsibility but
would sever the supervisor/subordinate relationship needed under the
doctrine of command responsibility.
Knowledge of the existence of some risk of a future violation of the law
is not sufficient. As noted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Blaikit, "[t]he knowledge of any kind of risk, however low, does not suffice

336. Subordinate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/subordinate (last visited Nov. 11, 2017); see also id. (defining "subordinate" to
include something "submissive to be controlled by authority").
337. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 97, art. 28(a) (The statute uses terminology such
as "forces" when referring to subordinates, indicating that it is not always referring to a
specific person.).
338. GUtNASL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 159 (2009).
339. Prosecutor v. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 197 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001).
340. Id. ¶ 198.
341. METTRAUX, supra note 338, at 157.
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for the imposition of criminal responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law." 342 Knowledge of previous breaches is
344
If
relevant. 343 The knowledge may be either actual or constructive.

constructive, the ad hoc tribunals have applied the standard that the superior
"had reason to know." 345 By way of example, the Appeals Chamber in the
Celebidi case noted that a commander would have the requisite constructive
knowledge if they had "received information that some of the soldiers under
his command have a violent or unstable character, or have been drinking
prior to being sent on a mission . . . ."346
Thus, it would constitute constructive knowledge if the commander was
informed that an autonomous system could not, for instance, reliably comply
with the requirement for distinction. Here, again, is where the importance of
weapons testing rises to the fore, as it is the weapons testing process that
provides knowledge to the commander as to when a given system should be
employed. A robust weapons testing process also serves as a measure a
supervisor can take to comply with the requirement to "take measures
necessary to suppress ... breaches [of the law]." 347 Reasonable measures
could also encompass a requirement to monitor the activity of the
autonomous system and take measures to address malfunctions or actions
that violate the law of armed conflict. Testing and refining autonomous
systems in a closed environment may also be considered a measure to reduce
breaches of the law of armed conflict.
Article 87 of Additional Protocol I further imposes on commanders an
obligation "to ensure that members of the armed forces under their command
are aware of their obligations . . . ."348 The commentary notes that the
commander satisfies this obligation by ensuring that the "unit gets proper
training." 349 While a machine is not a subordinate within the meaning of the
Conventions or Protocols, some autonomous systems can be trained as one

342. Prosecutor v. Blagkid, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 41 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/
en/130228_judgement.pdf (last visited Nov. 11,2017).
343. Sandoz et al., supra note 152, ¶ 3545.
344. See id. ¶ 3546 ("[T]aking into account the circumstances, a knowledge of breaches
committed by subordinates could be presumed.").
345. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 238; AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art.
86(2) ("[H]ad information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances
at the time, that [the subordinate] was committing or was going to commit such a
breach. . .. ").
346. Delalid, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 197.
347. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 86(1).
348. AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 87(2).
349. Sandoz et al., supra note 152, T3558.
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would train a subordinate. 3 50 Such a capability may give rise to a parallel
obligation to train the autonomous systems.
C. State Responsibility
The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility
(the Articles) articulate several well-accepted 3 51 general principles of State
responsibility, which hold that first, "[e]very internationally wrongful act of
a State entails the international responsibility of that State."3 52 Second, "an
internationally wrongful act" exists where, by act or omission, the conduct
"(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of the State."3 53 Article 12 then defines
an "internationally wrongful act" as an act of a State "not in conformity with
what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or
character."3 54 As the commentary to the Draft Articles notes, "[i]ntemational
obligations may be established by a customary rule of international law, by a
treaty or by a general principle applicable within the international legal
order."3 55
As detailed elsewhere in this Article, there are any number of
international obligations incumbent upon States, including the obligation to
review weapons to ensure their compliance with international law,3 56 and the
obligation to exercise distinction,3 57 proportionality,3 58 and precautions in
the attack.359 Further, as discussed immediately above, Additional Protocol I

350. See, e.g., STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH 693-767 (3d. ed. 2010) (detailing various methods of machine learning).
351. See James R. Crawford, State Responsibility, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 17 (Sept. 2006), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-el 093?prd=EPIL ("These are well established,
even axiomatic.").
352. Articles, supra note 95, art. 1.
353. Id. art. 2.
354. Id. art. 12.
355. Id. art. 12 cmt. 3.
356. AP I, supra note 77, pt. III, § 1, art. 35; see also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 34,
art. 48 ("All states are required to ensure that the cyber means of warfare that they acquire or
use comply with the rules of the law of armed conflict that bind the State."); PROGRAM ON
HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE § C(9) (2010) ("States are

obligated to assess the legality of weapons before fielding them.").
357. See AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. I, art. 48; HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK,
supra note 84, art. 1, 7.
358. See AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 51(5)(b), art. 57(a)(iii);
HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 84, art. 14.

359. See AP I, supra note 77, pt. IV, § 1, ch. IV, art. 57(1).
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obligates States to "repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to
suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which
result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so." 3 60 Where an
autonomous system employed by a State breaches these or other
international obligations, State responsibility may incur. Before a State can
be held responsible for such violations, the actions of the autonomous
system must be attributable to the State.
Chapter II (Articles 4-11) of the Articles address attribution: when an
action should be attributable as a matter of law to a State. Here, the Articles
attribute to the State the conduct of the organs of the State 36' and entities
exercising elements of governmental authority. 362 The Articles do not
distinguish between different elements of the government (e.g., between
military and intelligence agencies).
The Articles do not, of course, consider the potentiality of autonomous
weapons systems. Article 5 does, however, consider a situation in which "a
person or entity empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of
the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under
international law." 363 This article might be regarded as autonomous
weapons, which are systems that have been "empowered" by the State (e.g.,
activated) in order to "exercise elements of the governmental authority"
(e.g., conduct combat operations).
If this article is read to trigger State responsibility for an autonomous
weapons system activated by a State, the attendant liability will extend to
acts both anticipated and unanticipated. Article 7 makes clear that State
responsibility lies even where the agent of the State is acting ultra vires.364
The commentary makes clear that a State will be responsible "even if the
organ or entity acted in excess of authority or contrary to instructions."365
Even where a State is found to have violated an international obligation,
there are circumstances precluding the wrongfulness of the act of the State.
Chapter V of the Articles lays out six circumstances precluding the
self-defense, 367
consent, 366
to
wit:
conduct,
of
wrongfulness
368
369
370
countermeasures,
force majeure,
distress,
and necessity. 37' A

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

AP I, supra note 77, pt. V, § 1, ch. I, art. 86(1).
See Articles, supra note 95, art. 4.
See id. art. 5.
Id.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 7, cmt. 1.
Id. art. 20.
Id. art. 21.
Id. art. 22.
Id. art. 23.
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detailed discussion of the substance of these circumstances is beyond the
scope of this Article. It is sufficient to acknowledge the existence and full
application of these circumstances to situations where States employ
autonomous weapons.
Where there are no applicable circumstances precluding the
wrongfulness of the act of the State, a breach of an international obligation
generates obligations for the breaching State and rights for the injured
State.3 72 The obligations on the breaching State include the obligation to
"cease the wrongful conduct [and] make full reparation for the injury caused
by the internationally wrongful act." 3 73 Additional consequences follow if
the internationally wrongful act "constitutes a serious breach by the State of
an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international
law."

374

Thus, where a State violates an international obligation through the
operation of an autonomous weapon and there is no circumstance precluding
the wrongfulness of the act, then there exist several fora in which the State
may be held liable. The Draft Rules also incorporate a robust regime for
countermeasures which can be taken by the injured State. 375 Judicial fora
include the International Court of Justice and domestic courts; though
accountability through both systems would be hindered by issues of
jurisdiction.376
VI. CONCLUSION

Autonomy will undoubtedly have an enormous impact on the conduct of
hostilities. The newness and inherent complexity of the technology
underlying autonomy creates a great deal of uncertainty about how the law
of armed conflict applies to autonomy. As with any weapon system, the
employment of autonomous weapons systems requires an understanding of

370. Id. art. 24.
371. Id. art. 25.
372. See generally Daniel Bodanksy & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC's State
Responsibility Articles, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 773, 785 (2002) ("The breach of an international
obligation entails two types of legal consequences: it creates new obligations for the breaching
state, principally, duties of cessation and nonrepetition (Article 30), and a duty to make full
reparation (Article 31); and it creates new rights for injured states .... .").
373. Articles, supra note 95, art. 28, cmt. 2 (referencing arts. 30 & 21).
374. Id. art. 28, cmt. 2 (referencing Articles 40 & 41).
375. Id. arts. 49-53.
376. See generally Daniel N. Hammond, Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State
Accountability, 15 CHICAGO J. INT'L L. 654 (2015).
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the system and ability to control the system. The nature and reliability of the
system's operation is informed through the weapons testing process.
Effectively testing autonomous weapons requires sophisticated, and
possibly novel, means of testing. Tests must be designed to replicate the
environment in which the system is sought to be used, and weapons reviews
should reflect the scope of the testing protocols. An understanding of a
system, however, is irrelevant if the system cannot be controlled. Controlexpressed in time, space, and effects-can be exercised through the physical
manipulation of a system or through the programming of the system.
Effective control requires a skilled operator who can effect control over the
system.
It is clear that the law of armed conflict applies and provides an
effective normative framework to ensure the lawful employment of
autonomous weapons. It is equally clear that not all autonomous weapons
are the same. Some systems will be lawful and others will not. Indeed, a
given system might be lawfully employed in one circumstance but not
another. Simply put, some systems employing autonomous technologies will
be lawful in some circumstances, while other systems will not. In all
circumstances, development and use of autonomous weapons systems
should carefully consider the uniqueness of the technology and the novel
ways in which this technology affects the function of the weapons system.
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